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Introd.uot!on 
The railroads of the U:nlt eA ~' t...··J tee a re the la~gest 
s1ne;le transportation system t.hrt t.b.e m~t~ion pos~esses .. 
It !e sra~ter in siz.G, i~a3 :.U~l"G money 1n ~:n·ted ~ n tt, ~ 
and gives more service than any combln~tlon of our 
other transportation a.genc1ea. In some eectlons of the 
country 1t is the only ava1Lttble means of transportation. 
The progress of the r ail ways has pa r a.lle.led a nd 
c omplemented that of the country as a whole.. ··;tthout 
the rai lways the United St tes. being a land of con-
tinental dimensions could never have progressed to the 
soe1al, economic and: industrial stage that it no"'l en-
joys~ 1'he r ailroads h ave been and a re,. 1n a seneeg 
the backbone of the nation. Agricul ture and Industry 
t'Tould .still he in the infancy ·Of their developmen't 1f 
the transportation a fforded by the r a ilroads r,.ad never 
been ma de access.1 ble· to them... The Junerlcan way of life~ 
c ould hardly he s~stained ';71thou.t the basic tran:sport <... tion 
service th.: t 1e offereti by t he r a i lroads.., 
Eut nov1 a fter a century of growth the :ruilro:.1.da 
present us with one o · our most complex na tJ.onal prob-
l ems. This r apid gro 7th in r a i l r oad operation has 
lie. 
un1~1ed and integra ted our entire continent. The 
massing of millions of our peopl:B in large 1ndu·att ... 1al 
centers. the e .ont.inuous and e:rrective access of our 
factories teo l:"D.W ru;,~ terials d1o~a:ntly removed11 and 
the uninte.rrupted .and rap!d dirH.:r•i.Pu t.i0-1 of the fintsh€!d 
pr$du.cts of our 1ndu~ttt1a.l plants to me.r•kets ru1·tion-
w1de in scope~ are depen~"lent upon .the amoot. function-
ing of our r ail way system,. I~ rJ.. real aense the very 
11vea of untold rn1111ons living 1n our congested 
manufa.o turing .c1tles depend upon the transportEttion 
f a c11it1eo afforded by the railroads. 
But espec1ally ·1n the decade since 1929 our rai.l-
roads a s a. eyatem havo been undergoing a dishea.rtening 
tr._. nsformation. c,on:fronted VJ1th increasingly severe 
competition o:r pipe ... li~~$, highv~ay • waterway and more 
J:•ecent l y airway tra.nspor·tn t1on .. gene 1es re-sul ing !n 
l arge de~reases 1n ea rn1_ngs, the railroads h e1.ve been 
transformed from a vigorous , secure· and 1ndepend .... nt. 
industry t.o a weak, profitle-ss and near- bankrupt busi-
ness interm1na.oly dependent. on govern;, ent aidv 
Th1e problem of the die1ntergz•at1on of our r ail ... 
r oads must ba removed.. As a basis of our· ec nomic, 
po11t,1oal . an~ aoc1al sta.b:t.lity,. the r a i l r oad's mue~ be 
maint t=tined and preserved in the best and most eff1e1en't. 
mannero Their effectiveness eannot be curtailed ... 
111~ 
There can be no, extended national progress or pros-
per! t y m th the r ail roads 1n the condition tt.LS.t they 
are <1t p:reaent. There m1:1et ba something done t o re-
vive and recondit·ion the- •. I t t.h~y o.re undes1rous of or 
unable t o aecompll sh this themsel'\ree as la the co1mncn 
pra et.:tee of all p-rivata i austry , ·then, bt~ause of ti.leixo 
importance ttnd necessity t o the whole nation. the gove"'""n""' 
ment must make r.he· solution of t-he pro-blem its own 
work. Th1s would ordin.::.~.rlly mean gover:nment O\\o"Ue r ship 
an d operation 
Her e1n 0 it. has been intended t o def1.ne the problem 
whlch is faced by the r ailroads, a nd t o suggeat. a con-
s-tructive course .or action.. -he f aults undEn~lyillf'.> cer-
t a in phaGes ot milt• ~d trnn:sp~rtat1on are pointed out 
a long \11th the remedies for- thes-e ev11e. Because of 
the lnactivi ·ty nnd a pparent in.sens1bll1ty or the r allr ads 
t o their d1ff1cult1es. government ownerah1p and opera~ 
tion ha s been ttdvoca.ted a .e the qu~<?-kest and most favor-
a ble way bO redirect: the railways oaok to their f ormal\" 
secure and unfetter ed pos!t.:lon .. 
Chapter I 
A Brief History oE the Railroads 
The modern railroad 1s a result of tbe first ex ... 
tens1ve use or steam as a mot.1ve power ln England at 
about the end of the eighte-enth century. A~ t~&t. 
sta tionary -steam enginee wen 1liatalled t.o haul a 
etrlng o:t care along wooden planking. Soon 1t was 
d1sC).overed that 1t was poe.a1ble a.ncl more eff1,o1ent to 
put the engine 1~selt on another car. attach the mo• 
t1ve power to 1ts wheels, and thus a1mpllty the 
hauling. Th1s practice wae soon proven practical 
. when George Stevenson ran hie f amous nRoeketu pulling 
a load or care r aster than. a horae could pull a 
carriage .. 
American development paralleled that ot England 
although almost comple·tely independent. of the latter. 
The t1rst ra1lroa.de 1n the United States were those 
installed by certain quarries and coal mtnea 1n the 
8 t 1 20 e~ Tbeae were not steam powered bowever. and 
ho:re•s were \lt.111zed as the motive force. 
The f1r&Jt. oomm.eroial railroad ot any 1mpo~tance 
opened in the United States was the Baltimore and Ob1o 
which was chartered ln 1827. The company laid ita· 
tlret t.racka 1n 1828. Even at th1e date eteam was not 
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ueed at. the outset. Hora~u' and even w1nd power were 
tr1eGl but bo·tb proved ;re.lat1 vely unaucoesaful and 
eteam engines soon superseded them. (1) 
In the beg1nn1ng the growth of th1a road was 
not rap1d but nevert.helee.s when the line betwee-n 
Charlestown and Hamburg. a distance of 133 mlle:e was 
completed. 1t blpoame the longest e1ngle atretch . o£ 
railroad traok 1n the· world at the time.. (2) 
During the infancy of railroad development 1n 
the United States the linea constructed were usua lly 
short and consisted merely of one t.raek connecting 
two trading centers. or., perhapa. a canal shipping 
point and an 1nland town.. 'lbe prime reason tor the 
slow expansion or the f'1rs't railroads waa thelr com-
parative expensiveness coupled w1th the tact that it. 
was very d1ft.1cu.lt. to obtain large conoentrat1ons ot 
capital . As· a result even the largest a nd moe.t pros-
perous esyat.ems could ra.1ae no more than enough t.Q lay 
15 to 150 mllea ot track. 
This l ack or cap1t~l was ov:e~ome 1n a tow years, 
however, by liberal at.ate and auntolpal gra nts or both 
land and money to the new 1ndus~ry. The t.err1to.r1ea 
thus auba1d1z1ng the road·bu1ld1~ d1d so 1f1t.h an ey• 
to becoming commercia lly and industr1all-y pl"'osperous. 
(l} 
(2) 
Johnson_, R. J •• American Railwa1 Tranaportat.1on 
(New York. 1904) p. 1. · 
R&16el, R. E • .- The . Stor;y or the ~ ·estern Railroads 
(New York-. 1926) p . 3. · 
Thl& waa net, alway• th• result,., however. and many 
mlles or track 80 l a id y1.elded r~nr or the rew.ard 
which were expected or them. 
For lnatanee, th• State or lU.eeour1 apent tb1rty-
two· m1111on dolla.ra on ~ailroad constructi.On or Which 
after many yea rs of use t only au m1111on was xoega1ned.. (1) 
Later,.. the Federal Government began to help the 
railroads , and contributed muoh more thaa .d1d the 
sta tes .. ost of th1a a id ae 1n the f o rm o f l a nd ~nt,s-
although a great number Qf companies reoeived loane from 
t he Federal Treasury. lbe total aer-eage gran"ted ·by 
O·ongre.se 'to the ro11,.roa.de amounted to about 130,ooo.ooo 
acne. (2) 
Wl th th1a 1mpetu.a rurnlBhed by the government. the 
r ail ro . a ent ered a new phase · ot the1r ex1 tence . about 
1850. Large oQrporate tm1 t,a -were beginning to eome 1nto 
existe-nce and l al'ge amount,a of cap1tal were ava i lable 
tor the expansion of the ey&'t.ems.. Lines grew r apidl-y 
and whole sections became linked together where pre-. 
v1outn;r only \h.e larger ei tlee and towne bad been con-
nect-ed~ At th1s time.,. a l eo, many shorter 11nee were 
broUgb~ together under one management and opera-ted a-e 
a single unit. 
The New York Central Railroad attorda, a very good 
(1) Summers .• H.. B. and R .. E., The Reference Shelf • 
Vol 1:3t No. 2.- (1iew York• 1939) P• 2!. 
(2) Ibid . , p .. 33 . 
example ot tbie proce-sa ot • -l d1ng ·many small lines 
1nto one l arge compa.ny: 
Or1g1na:l ly. eleven companies owned and op-
erated the rallroade oompoeing the line 
oonne·ot1ng . Albany_ and. Buf'talo. and 1n 
1850 there were seven d1at1nct c.ompan1ee 
bet.waen these-two o1t1es. Qu~ 1n tb,e-
following year they we!'e united under 
one· management. T o yeare lat-er tohe 
Rlldson R1ver Ra11road beC1!1JD8 a part of 
the .cent ra.l ey~ttem. and by 1858 f''1ve 
more lines were added t:o th1s property. 
Thus was bull t up the powerfUl New York. 
Central System. (1) 
In the torty years trom 1850 to 1890 ra1_l-road 
building experienced Ita gre-atest deve1opment.- - Con-
structi-on expanded at a rapid- pace~ w1:th onl.J'- & t em-
pOrary set-back by the 01v11 War_, uat1l 1a 1890 -~re 
stretched throughout the nation approX1matel7_ l~_,ooo 
milee or railway line-e. (2) 
That \hla oona~ruct1on boo• reached •nortloue dJ.m-
. . ' .. . 
ene-lona; le boJ"ll& out by the t.ollottlna !'act: 
Between 1880 and 1690 the raU_W!!iY mileage 
· or the country 1nereas~ by liH)" than. · 
70.,.000 m1lee. an amount greater than the-
\ otal mileage of linea in operation in · 
1873. In the single year 1887 ae many 
a$ 12 .• 876 m1lee we:re eonstructed-··t.he 
best year since then {1n th1e counttry) 
ehow1ng less than 1.000 mt lea ,. (3} 
Slnce t.hat time roadbuilding haa 1nere-aaed a t a very 
-sm-a . 1 rate. F"dere, yardage and double tracking have 
accounted for a large part of t he building undertaken 
a1noe the tum ot the century. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3} 
J o:tmaon., R. J .. • Aaer1-can Ra.ll wax TJ:aa naport-a tion (New -York.. 1904) lh 26~ 
summers, H. B. and R. E. • The .Reference Shelf, 
VoL. 13 .• No. 2. (New York. 1939) p~ 20/ ·. 
lfottlton, H. G., The -American Transportation Problem 
(Wash1n ton 1935 • 6~ - · 
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Competition of this na ture eventually drove the 
r a ilroads into pool ing arrangements, and other types 
of r ate agreements. ~any of these adjustments be~ame 
s o obnoxious t o the shippers and manufacturers that 
Fedel.,.al laws regula ting r•ate making, pooling etc were 
passed . 
J>rlor to 1870. control coul d be exerc ised only 
thrm1gh provisions in the charters granted t o r ail road 
c orporations by st tee . This type of control \'JaB very 
ineffective; r a i l c. ds had a virtual monQpoly in trans-
port!' tion. About 1871 the v~r1oua states a ttempted to 
exercise control of t he r a i l roads through the enactment 
o f Jhat were known s t he "Gr anger l aws 11 o These laws 
were the forerunners of the Federa l Interst a te Commerce 
Act of 1887 and its many successors . The first la 7: 
The act t o regulHte commerce ;vas app-
r oved by t he President on February 4~ 
1887, and bee. me effective on t pr11 s. 
1'he act was made appl1c ble to · 11 com-
mon carriere by r a i l road engaged in 
1nterat~ te or foreign commeroeo This 
meant. pra ctic- lly all r ·1i l roads, since 
even intrasta te · r a ilroads engr-•ge in 
1nteretPte commerce . (1 ) 
Cal"r~.ers subject t o the act /'!ere re _uired to furnish 
transportat i on upon reasone.ble request, and to estab-
l isl : tr1rough routes and rea sona ble r a tes for this ser-
vice. · e ~ct also ere" ted .the Interst ate Commerce 
(1) Locld1n, F . D. , Economics of Tr anepgrt tion 
(Chicago ., 1935 ) p. 207 . 
Comm1eslon which consisted of f ive members appointed 
by the President ¥1th . the. eonsent of tae Senate . 'f'h~ 
e h1ef function of the Commission was to hear complaints 
f or all eged violation of the aot .. i e.aknesses soon ap-
peared in tne act wnich made additional legislation 
necessary. 
~~any of these . weaknesses were elimi nate d by the 
H• pburn ct which .:rae passed in 1906 .. \:any new and 
more aff ect-i ve powers were granted t he Comm1ssior.!,: 
The fir t of t hese and the :.Jne outstanding, 
i m."'ledlate, and of grea test i mportance gave 
t he Intersta te Commerc~ ·Gomm1ss1on. in lan-
gucge so c l ea r and unmistakable tha t a c n-
servat1ve court coul d not misunderstand, the 
right to presc.rlbe just :and rea son!;l.ble max-
imum r ates and t o -or der oo.nfor mity ·by t he 
carriers thereto .... ! e-eoond important pro-
-u1s1on was that · ~h1ch permitted the Inter-
St.ft te Corrunere:e Connn1as1o.n to prescribe a 
_uniform system of accounting for all agencies 
subject to th~ act. (1) 
The ct also g~.ve the Comm1ss.1on •a orders the force of 
a de~1s1on of a federal court. The Hepburn 1ct ul so 
proh i bited r a i lroads from carrying commodities mined 
or produced by the r a ilroad itself unless t he conu od-
it1e s were actuall y used in rail r oad operat1on e 
e . a nn-Elkins £1ct ~ passed in 1910, gave further 
~- powers to the Corm,!1Bs1on. · Incidentally. t h1e act also 
b'r'OU'-"'ht tel ephone and telegraph line ~ · .. mder the juri-
sdiction of the Commiss i on . Shorter hours r:ere pro -
., .... 
( 1) '. i ller, s .. L .. , Ra1lw, Y. .. :rr ns)orta tion, Principles 
nd Point of Vie1.1 t·Ie ·:1 Yorlt,. 1924) pp. 768-769 . 
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da rken. Competition •:ta.3 be\:omlng hea v ier t::.nd hea vier. 
Large o·baol esaenae and ma lnteaance .. ahar&es •vare t aking 
diapropol .... tiona -te amountn of rev~nue o Fixed cha rgG·B 
on overly large bond tasues became 1l'lcreaa-1ngly d1f-
f icul t to moet, and many 1\oada even a~ that da te ilere 
f orced t o default. As time went o:a. hr.tnkruptcies be-
-c ame mol"'e a nd mol"o com:aon; many ra1lro .·:- da~ once thought 
{'· . 
financ:ta l bulwarks, t1ere reduced to rece1ve:r.&l.~:1p.. ·-:v n 
so~ the pl ight of the r ail roads wa s not c onsidered. a s 
extremal y serious until about 1930 when the recent de-
presns.1on was beglnn :l.ng. From 19.30 l"eoe1vership f i gures 
i ncreased by l eaps and bounds a s the follo wing t able 
will bear out . 
Rai l road M:1leago in l\ac-e1:var:ah:icp and._ its Rel :s.tion 
t o Total _Rai lroad ~" 11eage (1930-38) Jl.l 
Date 
Dec. 1 929 
Dec .. 1930 
Deco 1931 
De-c. 1932 
Decfl 1933 
Dec. 1934 
Dec$ 1935 
Dec. 1936 
Doc., 1937 
:June 1~38 
Mi leage 1n 
Receivership 
<> . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . ~ 5 t706 
• • ~ • • 0 ~ • • • ~ • ~ ~ ~ ~ 9~486 
•••• 4 •• ••• ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ 12 ,970 
•• v-••••8- ••• • ·•· · · 22.545 
• • • ~ • ¥ $ • ~ • c • ~ 9 - • 41~698 
• • • • • • • u • • • • • • 0 • 42,168 
4.- o• ~o •.g • o•olo}» ¥o .Q 68,345 
~ • ~ • 4 ~ • 0 • • • • ~ • • • 69,712 
•• • ·• ·~· ·•u• ·o•••· ••• 75.118 
4rGo*•••oo• ••• •••• 77.560 
Par Cent in 
He cei versh1p · 
2 .. 19 
3 .. 64 
4 .. 99 
16.24 
16.54 
26.87 
27 o/J.-7 
29.71 
30.67 
(1 ) Sunl.'Yler~e: H., B .. a nd R .. E .. l) The Reference Shel;f. 
Vol 13, No . 2. (lew York. 1939) p .. 74~ 
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The year 1938 was a ptlrt1oularly bad one for 
the Railroads. The following is a picture of them 
as of July 31. 1938: 
Railroads in Roce1.versb1p (1) 
r:rumber of r oads in charge of receivers or trustees: 
Number or -class I RallrJaye .. . •.• , ......... 39 
Numbar of other Railways. • ...... o ••••••••• _]£_ 
Total ." . o _. '* • .tl . ... . o • ~~ "' o • o ... o ........... "" ;Q 111 
:ales o f Road operated • ., •• ~ • -~ o • o • • • • • • .. .. '78 ,016 
Ca ...... 1 t al s tock .......... ._ .......... o . . ..... . 
Unmatured ded Debt •9···~·-~ ..... . 
-.1atured Funded Debt ................. . 
Other ·bt e. ·Q . .. . " • Q , •• .• . . v • .•• u. . ........ . 
Invest ent 1n Road and Equipment ... 
Percenta ge of all Steam _ a.11ways: 
~.:1les Opera ted .............. ~ ......... " .. 
Inv 9 t.. in Ro::. d a.nd Equipment ... ...... .. 
C~pltal Stock·· · ··· · ·~·············· 
Unmatured FUnded Debt •4••• '• ·•••• ·••o••· 
26 .. 15 
20 .. 51 
19 .. 84 
23.01 
Thus. in t h e yea r 1938 over 28 per cent of all. our 
r ailroads were in the hfl.nda of receivers. At l east. 
1t must be admitted the railro~1ds do have a problem. 
From this short study of American railroad de-
velopment, t"t'lo f acts are important: First, moat of 
the imp rt-ant r ail roads constructed between 1850 a nd 
1890 reoe1 ved large granJ;n of land and money from t he 
. ederal and St a te Governments through whose territories 
-----..., ---~~ (1) Hearings of' House Gommit.tee on Interstate .. nd For-
eign Commerce on Omnibus rr•r nsport tion Bi ll . 
1.939. p.. 39. 
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they passed.. ; d second :J) when the r apid growt.h of the 
half century before the -;·or l d \li.:'.r ended an~ .oompet1 tlon 
from other form-s of transportati on began to encro9.ch 
u pon VJhat vras former l y aolel y the r a i lroads t bus1naQs., 
t h e r ailroad probl em a s it exis~~.s t oday t-ool~ on !te 
mor>e serious, more Jeopa.rd1a1ng a spects. In ll1'3.ny ·ins-
tances 1.nterest cha r ges were n.ot ·met;; maturing debts 
were me rel y refunded; and maintenance ~.nd deprec1~ t1on 
fm'lds were negl e·cted. 
From a small , precarious a~d _unpretentious in-
dust ry p the railroad& have become one of t:he largest 
s1ngh~ bu.ainesaes in t he country. · Oftentimes, m1a-
m.an.(..ged a.nd f1nanc1ally over-burdened •. they are a t 
present.. the greatest t,_.,.ansportati on agency within 
the Un:lted St ates. Because of many de·l ibera t$ mist 3.kes 
m~de in the p:.-1st. and because, , l so~~ o:f' other new con-
d1 t!ons and c1roumst..:..nces they have been unable to fore ... 
se& 11 the railroads are 9 at present. beset wit~ all man-
ner f diff iculties.. Admit t edly over-capitalized, a nd 
\Vlth decreAsing revenues . strong competition. and lleed~ 
tu1 of many repa1r.e, the r a i lroads a re today under -pr1v"' te 
o1111.ersh.!p in a poeit.ion from which there seems no pos-
sible me ns of esca pe insof a r us their present manage.-
ment ls concerned .. revertheless, they must e.t s ome ti1:ne 
1n the nea r future be cured of t.halr many ills, e l se 
our Jl.-::;\t!onal prosperity is end· ngered. .. 
Chapter II 
'lhat 1e Governmen-t Ownership 
Thr oughout the whole history ot the railroads or 
the United St a tes there has existed no other form of 
ownernnip and operation than private ownership, ex-
cept f or two or three very r 1nor instances . The rail-
r oad in ; laska is owned and pera ted by the federa l 
government through the supervision of the governor of 
the territory . Th1e railroad offers few arguments 
it.her for or aga inst cotnpl ete government c;wnorship 
a.s it was built solely for political and economic reas-
ons, t o provide needed traneportat1on · servi ce in a ne11 
territory t oo thinl y settled to hold any prom1.se of 
profit from com:nercial operation.. The Pan a &!3. ilroad 
operated by the government in · conjunet~1on ¥ i th the 
Panama Canal is of l ittl e value a s an appeal to ex-
perience.. Its special purpose does not allow it to 
enter 1nto the pre .•~ent discussion. 
Heret ofore ., private enterprise in the opera tion 
of the r a 1lroo.ds of thie .count r y has become to be a.c ... 
cepted most generlllly as the onl y and proper form of 
m. nagement. The public for the most part do not quite 
comprehend the idea of compl ete and permanent govern-
ucnt ovnership and operation. Therefore, it seems 
proper to expltJ.i!l what government · ?J.nership meana v a nd 
the various forma it may take. How-ever. before a t,tempt-
1ng this., it might be well t o g l anc.e a t the nort exist-
ing system or private enterprise. 
Priva te enterprise 1n our .r a i lways l.ncludes ·the 
1"oll ow1ng ideas and concepts. First of a l l, pr1v·., te 
oa.p1tal1ats determi ne · hat amount of rail r oad faolli-
tles shal l be provided. a nd just where t hese f acilities 
sh~ll be placed. 'I'hey a l e.o furnish the fund~a and 
credit necessary to buil d and e quip the railroads they 
deem necessary and profitable~ These capita lists choose 
t he managers and directors of such enterprlsoa.. 'I'he 
direc tors in turn choose the rest of the personnel who· 
w111 actua l ly operate the r a ilways. 
Lhese directors are f'1nano1a1ly r-esponsible· for 
t he results. They meet the costs of labo1 .. , taxes etc .. ; 
combat oompetit1onil a nd still show a profi t. Ultima tel y 
the ean1ta11sts ga1nthe profit or suffer the losses a s 
t heirs 1s the money that actual ly constructed the roads .. 
Thus, ln these reapects priv-..1te onterprlse in r ail ays 
resembl es privata enterprise in the other types of 
eeonom1c activity.. ~ana.gement ha s 1.te authority t o 
conduct the business from ownership. Rarely • otmar ... 
s h ip and management may be one, but ordinaril y this . 
does not happen 1n the l crger modern corporation. The 
essence of private ownership ls, then. the right this 
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ownership posseeette to operate and manage either di-
rectly or indirectly 1ts enterpr i.aos .. 
Railroads , however, have oeen regulated more and 
more by eta t:.ute than most other types of pr1v, ... te ente r-
prise. The r ailroad ow era have . duties ov:ing to the 
genera l publ ic ih1Qh ot her forme of enterprise do not 
have .. For example, th(!) la1; has stated tha t private 
ownership cannot bui ld railroads at wi ll. nor cn.n they 
abandon thone a l ready constructed a:t will.. The government 
oompe l ~ the r ail ways t o lll8;1nta 1n ade qtJa te service .t. charge 
f a ir pr1eea ., not t o mention numerous other obligr'J.. t1one .. 
hie regu1 .~tion by government has its beginnings when: 
A few of the 1nd1v1d~~l states t ook the 
initial steos 1n the creation of r ail-
r oad com.u.1es1on~ and the 1nt_enae r e sent-
ment 1n the N 1ddle- 1,Veat against high 
r ates and d1eer1m1nat1on was erysta11zed 
1n the ant1- ra..11rol'l d Granger .... ~ovemente 
of' the 1870 's,.. Bec ause of the prepond-
erance or interstate traffic and because 
state l aws regulat ing r a i l roads went be -
yond const.1tut1onal 11ra1ta.t1ons, s tate · 
r-egulation proved. to be 1neffecrt.1ve a nd. 
a fter sever'l l ye<A.rs of study by Congree-
aional committees and ext..ended. debate . the 
paeauge of the 1887 Act to Re gulate Com- · 
merce and t he creation of the !nterstn.te 
Com ~erce Commission marked the beginnings 
of feder11l regulut 1.on o:f r a i l roads.. (1) 
The eyetem of pr1vate O\vnership 1n industry 1s 
usually defended on several grounds.. It, 1s said that 
pri vate ownership 1a l ikely to be more alert. since 
it must depend upon 1 ts ot,;n eff .orts f'or success .. 
( 1) Cunn1nghamlt ~·J q ,.r ... , The Present Ra1lroa d Or1 s1s 
(Philndelph i , 1939) p.2 .. · 
Private o mersh1p,, it is contended. will be more cr1-
t1c.a.l of tlla 1 ·agement because of the r~at the owners 
ha.ve t heir ovm capita l 1nvested in the enterprise. f.l ao. 
thereby, management ;;tll1 be held more definitely to re-
sponsibil ity for t he profitable and eft1a1ent operation 
of the buetneeso Constant cr1tlo1em by the o mers$. 1t 
1s sr- 1d,. will produce more 1n1;1'.1a.tive and w1111ngne oe in 
m_ ng.ge~1ent.. The conclus1on is , obviously. that under and 
t hrqugh private o mership a nd opera.t,1on the.re will r esult 
more efficiency, econoihY and progress tr1an under c ny 
other f ,;rm of O\'mership and control. In the h1stoey of 
the r a ilroads. ho•r~ever., this contention has all t.oo . 
often proved untrue. ,.,!ana.gement has not always had tlle 
bes t lntere st of o mersh1p a t he. rt. Many are t lte thou a~ 
nds of stockholders \1ho will testify to this. 
"oreoverj it seems logica l to presume Mw.t -;.l pri-
vate ownership f.s ca pable of etf ecting the ull..im!Z. te 1n 
_economy n.nd progress, the ra.1J.roads today would be 1n a 
strong f1nanci 1 position. independent of public aid. nd 
C Ot_ para t i vely free of government regulation and control. 
The f a.ct that the oppo:eite is true of the r n i lways as an 
industry seems to emphatically disprove the above con-
tention .. 
In summation, a.s regards the form of enterprise 1n 
use, it may be said: 
In the United States. r a i l r oads have 
been organized a s priva te enterprises 
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in their O\vnersh1p and operation a s 
rega rds the source ot their capital 
and the authority to mnnage them; 
but they h Lve been subjected to etrlct · 
regulation to enforce their public 
duties. (1) 
The railroads because of their public nature muat be 
stl"'ictjly ree;ulE.ted lest they sa.er1f1ee t.he needs ot 
the n~tlon f or their own private ends. 
In contrast to private ownership., government o rmer-
ship means that the goverm1.1ent replaces the private 
owner as the ca,p1talist.. The government now supplies 
the money and credit needed for 0.1::<erat1on; determines 
hat these operations shall be~ and where and when they 
shall t ake place. The government takes the prorit or 
1noura the losses ae the case may be.. Broadly speaking. 
in a. democracy lt 1s the people. conduoting their own 
transportation system. 
Before discuae1ng the many different. ways in which 
the government ca.n part1c1pate in r ailway ownership and 
operation, 1 t might be well to speak af r:S.Q.Vernruent owner-
ship of our r a ilroads · in regard to our :form of government.. 
·tany persons t.hink that pub11a owner r.rip- of the r a ilroads 
ca.n only be had under a socialistic form of government .~ 
Tb1.s 1.dea 1 .e completel y f alse: In regard to damocl"'B;cy 
and public o nersb.1p , :r .. Joseph F.a.stman states: 
Public ownership and onerat1on of r ail -
(i) Hinshaw. D .. , Stop, Loolt and Listen {!Jevr York, 1932) 
p .. 45~ 
roads 1s not 1naona1atent with our 
American theory of government . The 
early charters ott en contemp~a. tod 
the possibility of euch a policy .. 
It has al11ays been x-ecogn1zed~ no-
t ably by the Supreme Court., that 
a railroad 1s a pub:.t1o industry, 
and t .hat 1 t oerforms a function 
ot the state: (1) 
The question of government ownership and operation 
is not :on,e of theory in reg.'lrd to our -American system 
of government, but 1s. r ather , one of pra.ct1cal ex-
ped1ency* The question is not whether government 
ownership is possible under the Constit.ution; it 1e 
whether under present QOnd.tt 1one 1 t would not be more 
pr~crt1cal to have the £edera1 e overnment own and oper-
ate the r ailroads. 
'!'here are many ways 1n which the .govcr runent may 
part1c1pate !n o ·mership and operation of the r r 1lroads. 
-
F1:rst. without regard t o oper,. t1on the government may; 
1 . Own outright all the property both tangible 
and intangible of all the r a1l wa.ys within the 
nation. This may ~ome a.bout by gradual acqui-
eition Ol? by a ~omplete t .wrnov·er Of -property 
f'rom privat-e t p\.lbl1c owner.ehlpo 
2. o m only a. part of th.e tot al l"'ai lway mile age 
within its borders ... That is~~ some ·ra 1lw1 ya 
woul d be in private and others in publ ic hnnis . 
'l'hls 1s the condi t1on that ex.tets 1.n Canada. 
(1) Senate Document 119, 3rd Congress, 2nd Session 
First Report to the President and Congress of Joseph 
Eastman, Federal Coordinator of Transportation . p. 1. 
3. Own s ome distlnct pt3.rt of the property :tn 
each of the rail 'l y systems •. with priva te 
ownership 1n the rema.incler.. Here, the govern-
ant ownership extend s through all t he r a i l -
ro~lds. but only through partial ownership 1n 
each~ 
The uoove a re merely methode of o·.mel"ship alone~ Each 
o f these may be acco pan1ed by operation also .. Or ith-
out. assuming ovmersh1p. the government m.a.y acquire by 
.lease the r,.ght t o operate the r a 1l raads.. 1h s wa s the 
method adopted by t he federal government during the 
\ or l d ·;:' r. Vice versa, the government mSty ow" t he r a. il-
ro ~ s a nd l e ase them to priva t e operat1ng .compan1es .. 
Final y • the govem: ent may a ssume compl ete o :>mer-
sh1p and oper~t1on .. · If this is the method ct1osen~ 'the 
me tt od of management \'70ul d l ikely f all under one or 
t .10 f orms.. E1 ther opera t1on :rould be ca rried. on by a. 
government bureau directl y u·~tJ er presidentia l 1 .. :nd con-
gressi onal 1nflue~ce, . or. mora· likely~ b.y <l :;overnment 
ot:med but quasi-priv te eorpora t1on.. AdVQCC~.tes of 
government ownerehtp 1.n t h1s c ountry have f or the moA J 
part tended t o f av or the second plan as the better one. 
They feel that certain pol1. tical evils p:t"esent u.nder the 
burea.ucrr t 1c method woul d be e l imina ted by the c orporate 
p l . n.. Senntor Burton K. ~!heeler states: 
Ther-e are sever 1 reasons ~hy the cor -
porate f orm uld be necessary in ac-
2l~ 
qu1r1ng and op~rat1ng the railroads. (1) 
These reasons, as 11ated by :1.r. Joseph B. Eastman are: 
1 .. Extension of pol1t1c -l patrona.ge 
(the "spoils system" ) into the 
service. 
2. Interference with ~ te a djustmentss. 
pa rticularly to help certain 
groups or localities. 
3. Interference with construction 
programs, pa.rt1cula.rly to pro-
mote l '""'rge expenditures for the 
benefit of certain loeal1t1es 11 or 
as a means o.f socia l relief. 
4$ Interference with labor rela -
tions, including wages and work-
ing conditione .. (2) 
Concernlng Which, Sens.tor ~ . eel er writes: 
·~ setting up a corpOration to · be known 
as the United States Railways, possibly 
empl-J.y.1ng a statl!tory grant of power 
similar· to that .1n t.he Tennessee Valley 
Authority Act, 1::tnd with additional 
speoif'ie safeguards, these d ngere 
could be avoided. (3) 
Throu_gh a corporation such as Sena tor \ 'heel er .advocates 
the r a ilways are opera ted as a eem1- 1ndependent agency 
not directl y influenced by political winds. 
The distinction be,:flweerl these two methods of man-
agemen t lies 1n the rela tionship which the governme.nt*s 
opera tion of the ra1lw.ays wil l bear to other government 
functions; nnd a l so , the re l ationship the railway per-
sonnel will bear to other government personneL. If the 
c or por a te method .should he adopted:, 1 t ts intended that 
(1) 
( .2) 
(3) 
-::.heeler,. B. J., Government · cqu1a1:ti.on , and Ope~p.t- 1on 
of the Ra i l r oads in the . Uni:te d .S;ttates ."- Ann~l s at~ 
A, e:r1ca n Acndemyl · Vol • . ~81', (!eptamoer 1~35; 1h: 14·3 
Senate DOcument 19, 3ra Cop~ae, 2nd weee1on, p. 3. 
Annals~~ p. 143. 



re certain c onditione which must obtQ1n if government 
operr- tion of the r a ilroads is to be successful. These 
conditions ~as set dom by rJr. Eliot Jones, a re: 
1M Able and honest · administrators munt 
be chosen to manage the railroads. 
2 .. l 'he rank and file o the employees 
must be treated f a tr:ly and humanely .. 
They shoul d be accorded ad~quate wages, 
rea sonable hours and B.:-.t.la:·.,_,tcry 
working conditions genera lly, includ-
ing security of poet tion.... · 
3~ Politics must be exclu ed from ·-nage-
me.nt. 
4. The finances of the railroads must be 
kept. epa r a te frcL• the fin .. ces of other 
depart ento of he government, and the 
ccounts must be kept so th t t.he 1 1nG.n -
c1al results can ~e a ecerta n d. 
5. There muot be an in;1m~te connection 
·between the rt i Lvay dmin1strat1on n.i.' 
tile shipping and tra velling public ••. 
6. J\ a a coroll ry of the foregoing , a n 
act1ve and enlightened public ouinion · 
must. be developed. 'Ihe public must 
com' to see the import nee , nay . the 
necessity of se~uring and reta ining 
a ca~~ble body of tra ined public ser-
vants, dedicated to the public service, 
a nd de" -r to political considerations 
and to the pl eas of specia l int erests • . • 
. [he educ!'ltion of the pe ople to the 
p 1nt, where they 111 deinand an honest 
.. nd eff1~1ent. adm1n1str·::t tlon o:f the 
ra.i l ·•Jays in · ecordance with sound bw" i-
uess principles. rathe t> than as a n aa. -junct of pr rty pol it1csp 1s a prere-
quisite to BUfJcei:la in gover;pm(mt o·--: .er 
ship a nd oper<t1on. 
There is no doubt a broadly cleveloped and well insti-
tuted plan for govermnent ownership and oper· t1on 
functioning through a corpora te enterprise and ca-
(1) Jonea. E .. • Principles of Railway Trans por_tation 
(?~ew York, 1924) p. 541-544. · 
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pa.ble. of effecting euch aond.1t1one will be a euccess 
1n 1te opera.tion of the na tlon'B r .a1lroada . It w111 
be remembered, ho~rover, that such conditions cannot 
be brought about in a fe~ months, or ever , ps rhaps, 
a few yea.rs. ..But- 1 gi,_,en t1me foJ."' experimentat i on 
through t rial and error# evbntually~ 
Public o;·merahlp a nd. apera tiur; of 
the r a ilways under the federa l govern-
ment w111 permit the 1ntegrat.1on o:r 
the r a i l ways in the manner most con-
ducive to safe, efficient, and eco-
nomict-11 opera,tion. Federal finan-
cing wil l cost much l .ees 1..tnder fed-
eral ownership and can be much more 
wisely directed thqn either ~ate 
or publ ic fin :'..tncing under priva te 
ownership ar~ operat!on. ·ne nec-
essa:r-·y ooo:r>d1nat1.on f rail ways w!th 
otr~~r types of tra.naportn.t1on ean be 
done in a ·manner to safe~uard public 
1n"t:.ereets only if there .1a complete 
government control of the r a ilways. 
The 1romed1ate rehab111tat1on of 
r a.1lwa.y f e111t1ee, which 1e abso-
lutely eseential to the s __ f e ana ~f­
fic1ent operation of the railw~ys 1s 
not poss ible excepting t"' '- ~~:> U&"'l federa l 
financing. nd 1t v1111 b e · ery diff i-
cult unl ess. w1tb federal financing , 
there 1s also federal ownership and 
o per·a t1on . (1) 
{ 1 ) Laidler, H. N. , 'l'ha Case for Federa l Ownerah 1 E of 
!la.1lroada " 'fh1rteenth Annual D~ha~e Book (1939=40} 
Vol ~ 1.9 pp~ 132-133. 
Chapter III 
,fhy Does Government- Owne-rship Arlee 
All student . of the r ailr oads of the United states 
agree thnt our r a1lro· d system le beset t"11t·h m-.sny seve e 
pr o l ellis.. Some have resulted from the general busi -
ness de pression of the '30 * a~ th1le others are strictly 
dl ff'!cul ties o f the r n l l.·a ys themselves, e.g. ever in-
cre a sing c ompet l t1on and huge -fixed cha rges. ' nese 
proble e do not only a ffect the present stabili t y of 
the r i lrc~tds but als o the very future of all r a ilro, ... d 
tr · s porta tion. The r · i lways a re one of our moat 1m-
portant and most v1t.a.l industries. hey represent n 
sttm.nted c a r-'1 t al investment o f t enty five billions 
a s c om_:tred with a tot·l nntion::tl investment in all 
our industries of from 400 to 450 billion dollars. (1) 
Tne :r~a11 industry le one of the best single customers 
of nearly all our ba sic industries--the amount of 1ts 
purchases greJ~,• tly a ffecting the prosperity of the l a t-
ter . 
l'he import~ nee of the n .. tion's. r ~"' i lroads does not, 
ho r:reverg l ie i n bignees z;l.lone , nor in f1n~.nc1al ".iOrth. 
Its grea t e st i mport:)_nce is t o be f ound 1n the f act that 
( 1) Su.'Iilllers, H .. B .. £tnd B .. :;' .,v The Reference Shell 
rol. 13~ -Io . 2 {.!ew York 9 1939) p .. 9 . · 
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it i s the number one tra nsp rta t1on agency 1n t - lt:a.nd . 
The nation a.a a ~Thol.e probably depends more pon t he 
r.;, ilro~d system than any ot her industry except the 
agricul tur 1 1n ·uetry . .. ithout its aid~ the cout;t:y'e 
. pr o ="'resa would have been 1m'!"! o 3.S urr bly retar ded. In 
1937 (a. good r a i l r oad year as compa red with other de -
pres ~ ion years } the r a i l r oads ha ul ed ab ut 65 per cent 
o f the t ot - 1 t onnage moved 1n th1e country; a:n ·· · in 1926 
they ha uled over 75 per cent o f the tot 1. (1' .t.h uail 
even t hough competit i on ha s _ade 1- r ge inroads 1n t 
their fre1g..l1t, business 1n r ecent years9 they ai'e , never-
t h -" l ess» our l s.rgest transporta t ion agency • 
• 
1hie is t he reason why the problem of the r a11-
r od3.s 1e of such magnitude i n t he eyes of the govern-
ment,.. r·o all of us, its solution is i mpor t ant thoue;h 
few o f us, a t present realize 1t,s presence . I n a ny 
solut2.oniJ. there fo re» tha t is proposed, the best in-
terest s nd the c ommon weli'a re of t he 7hol e nP-. t!on must 
be !.rept ln mind; not the personal interests of the few 
1ndividuala 9 comp·ra t l vely s pea king. who are direc t l y 
concerned with t he i r f1na.nc1 , 1 futures as influenced 
by t at, o f t he r a ilrondso 
!n any discussion of our railways, one major tl1f-
f1calty presents itself. I t is the probl e m of con-
st? ntl y shrinking income necess1t. ting a 'liiholes '?.. l e 
trend t o insol vency and finally bankruptcy. 
(1) Cunn1nghc~m, ;:,; e J . • The Present ~a1lroad Crisis 
(Ph11adelphia, 1939f:P~~26. 
Looked a t in not.her l ight t his troubl e may be 
said t o be not the problem itsel f. but r ather the re-
sul t or effect of a nu.mber ot problems which besat the 
r a i l r ads. ;'Jh at 1s c om.1llonly referred to as "t he r a i l -
r and probl em" i s i n reality a combination of many up-
sett'lng conditions troubling to a grea.ter or leeser 
deg!"ee all the individual r " ilro, companies th. t to-
gether f o!"m the r a ilroad syste1 . • 
·nere "'ore , the proble e t ha t . ffect one or a fa,; 
r a i_roads , .. re in a sense the problems of t hem all. 'Ihe 
oo.:.1) etG system cannot oper· te · t its best 1t it 1e 
c omp sed of alterna te l y good and poor roads~ If t h e 
.-.merio ---n r a i lway system 1s t o be most efficiently oper-
a ted, each unit must be efficient. There cannot e, 
a t the same t1 .e, some successful and nome uneuccessi'ul 
r ailroad comp~· n1es 11' the whole network 1s to func tion 
i n the best manner. 
ne i mpOrtant f aetor contributing t o t.~. e present 
· c ondl t ion of tlle r a1lro··de is found 1n the f'e.ct th.3t 
t he physical structure of the combined r a ilway system 
is n o t o ne ma king for a high degree of efficiency . I t 
1s nn evident truth that the rail ro:: d s o f this count ry 
were not constructed a ccording to any definite plan .. 
Th ey simpl y grew 9 ~nd their gro ·;th wa s disordered. 
Consequent l y, today. there is much duplica ted and need -
l ees tr-· cl a.ge in use 1n many sections of the country .. 
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In ref'erence t o this cond! t,ion s 1.t1ue l Unter,neyet"' de -
c lares : 
There can be no question that a large 
part of our present r a ilroad system 
of 250,000 mil es in unrenumera t1ve 
under normal cond1 t1ons. ..s l ong a s 
15 years ago the traff ic manager of 
one of our 1er.d1ng systems t e stified 
that not over one- third of the Ne w 
?a.ven or Boston and .~aine eyste ns 
was then operating on a. rem.uner t1ve 
ba sis. iro form of man.a.fi$ement could 
be . •• more incompetent ~ (1 ) 
I n the heyday of r ilroad compe t ition three or f ur 
lines · are ften built bet een important business 
centers; and today. t hese l ines a re s-till operated 11 
'7here one or possibly two l inea could effi ciently ·-nd 
e ffectively h~ ndle the trnffic. · here 1 a.lso much 
i'Jc. steful d upl1cP-tion i n freight ha dl ing f cil1tie s ,. 
Coopernt :tve freight handling ould save many systems 
1-rse -mounte .. During b1s three years as coor dinator 
~ ~r . ust,na.n c..nd his sL ff devoted large p.st:t>t of· their 
time to the s t udy of coordinat i on of physica. f a ili-
ties -nd service ""'t terminals in cities served by t wo 
or more rail! oads " They f ound much upl!c · t1on of 
y r ds , eng·nehousee» stations etc., where lt was pos-
s 1b],e t o give the s :=tme qual ity o r service a t lower 
c os t thr•ough joint u ,e of one f ac111 ty and abandonment 
o f the others. .~r. ·: ctlter ., Cunningham states of 
(1) Untermeyer, Samuel, Hobson's Choice Between Govern-
men-t Ownership and Bankruptcy of the Ra ilroads , 
Reference Shelf, Vol.--13 , NO. 2, p. 131. 
3le 
. Ea stl!k"ln • e survey: 
Alt ogether more than f1.ve thousand 
terminal e1tuat1 ns \ ere studied. 
The economic possib111t1as ere · 
f ound t o be large. The estimate or 
the central s t .ff mts t hat s.nnw 1 
savings of ·56,093,498 could be ef-
fected. (1) 
Concerning adJ acent r a i l r oad lines t he mernbers of The 
Third Fortune Round Table held that: 
I n many instances shifts in the lo-
cation of industry have seriousl y 
a ffected p r alle l roads.. Four 1ines 
now opar . te through service betreen Manhat-
tan and Chicago . hen probabl y t wo 0 _ 
l inea coul d hnndle the same busine~• · (2) 
And · ith reference t o te lnal char ges t hey c ontinue: 
At presen.t J\merican r a i l r oads epend 
about bill i on dollars annually f or 
te:rmin~l service~. A large par't of 
this overhead could be eli mina ted by 
consol idation or coordination, re• 
sulting in tne ab~ndon~ent of certa i n 
pl .nt~ Similar esvings woul d a rise 
fro !l the coope r f' t1ve h".ndl1ng of 
pn.ckPge fre ight, a freight c ar pool1; 
a centra l accounting clearinghouse, 
the m. as pro uction of ca.rs "' nd ·l oco-
motives, a nd the elimination of cir-
cuitous routings I n a number o f in·-
stcnces the r a1l rot ds now charge more 
for a shorter direct r a i l route t han 
t hey do for a o1rcu1tous h· ul via r il 
and water. The economic wastes in-
volved 1n such rates would be ss ved 
through L .. rge sea l e c onsoli dat 1 ns... {3 ) 
And in concl1.1Blon they ~tate : 
(1 ) 
(2 ) 
(3 ) 
Some railroad stud nts bel ieve that, 
for the traffic availa ble i n the future , 
the railroad tra ck ge of the count ry 
Cunningham~ \ • J .. ·, The Pre sent Ra1lroaa Crisis 
(?h11a.delj:lb.1a , 1939) p. 52. 
Transporta tion Pol icy and t he .. a.ilro_ade , ~.,ort.une, 
· ust, l939 p . 50-51 . 
Ibid., Jt .. 51. 

and terminal s and f c1l ities and 
by pool ing t he i r tra.tt'ic with the 
approval of the Intersta te Commerce 
Comm1 ss ion.~ if t hey :voul d. They 
ha ve been urged t o ava i l themsel ves 
ot t hese rights by t he Commis s i on., 
and they have not done it. (l) 
R 1l r oad m.."lnagements with t heir shortsighted outlook , 
have re f u e d t he .~1ds offered them. They have-main-
t a i ned a pol i cy of isola t i onism a nd 1ndiv1dual1sm all 
t oo l ong. They woul d not and they could not see the 
ultlm~ te benefit s of a coopera tive pol i cy • • a The 
Third. ortune Round Table expl a ins i t: 
The di ff iculty with coordi nation, }low-
ever, is t ha t it l ec..ves untouched ex-
ist ing ownership; and no r a ilroad 
wishes to give up to i t s competitors 
·the use of terminal s and ot her st"' ... 
t eg1o properties that it h s acqui red 
t hrough t renuous effort and upon ~ h i ch 
i ts present compet i t ive position may be 
ba sed, even though such ch nges , re 
hel pful t o t he industry a s a whol e. (2 ) 
Apropos of the economies 1ch might be ach ieved t h r ough 
coor di nation • . ~r . 'Ea s tman, repre senting the Inters t c t e 
Commerce Commissi on a t hearings on t he Lea Bi ll betore 
t he r ou e Co 1t tee on: Inter s t te and Fo.re1gn Commerce, 
ha.e more r ecentl y s t a t ed :. 
The c ommission i s convinced tha t there 
1 s a very large amount o:f waste in 
tr ns porta t 1on ope t iona as they now 
are c onduct ed in this country.,. h i ch 
coul d be avoi ded or m terially r e-
duced ~ so f s t he r a i lroads re con-
cer ned . by t he process of consol i dat ion 
nd coor di na t 1on • .• The apparent i nter e s t s 
Cl) enton , J . E., Hea r i ngs of House Committ e on I nt.er 
s t a t e and Foreign Commerce , r-~a.rch 24, 1939 p. 164o. 
(2 ) ·Tans port t1on Pol i cy ' nd t he R 1lr oads , ~ortune , 
ugus t 1939 p . 51 . . 
ot the carriers are too divergent, and 
there are f :q r t oo many or them to per-
mit ot the necessa r y le,dership !thin 
their own r anks . (1) 
' lthough it is ea sil y possible for t,he advocrte 
of government o."lnereh1p to exagge~ate the savings from 
c oor d1n tion and consolidation~ i t is s r1d, 11 that they 
would eventu ... l ly t o t al bet .een" 200 r.md 300 m1111nn 
dol l a !,..B a ycrr, and if one{~ 1ncludas the sav ings 1n 
c apita l expenditures they · ould go much h igher ... " (2 ) 
H. more 11 beral es t imate is th t of L.. \ . J enny, r a ilroa d 
c onsulting s nglneer l."lhO sta ted before the House s Com-
m1ttee on Intersta t e and Foreign Commerce on v .. arch 21, 
1939 tha t: 
I bel ieve tha t 1t 1e sa fe to s ay that with 
r "'.ilr onds organized into a single na t l l'l-
a l syet em 11 t he aiinu 1 savings may be be-
t: ?Sen ;'750,000,000 and l,ooo.ooo,ooo. 
If the r ailr oads ;vere consoli date d into 
six regional systo e resulting sav ings 
my total 50o.ooo.ooo. {2) .· 
Les 1e Cr ven, wr1t1ng 1n the Atlantic .. onthly, gives 
anothe r figure . He .s t a tes: 
It is very difficult. to estim~ te wh t 
s av i ngs could be accompl ished by con-
s ol ida t ions since the amount s aved will 
depend upon the na ture nd condit i on or 
the plan under . iC:."t t hey re 1na ugu-
r a.ted . 1'he savings f r om a seven-systems 
p ( 'lithout considering the expense . 
clue to the protection of l·bor ) have 
been estir_ated by t hoo:oe f r1vor1ng such a 
plan at . a s high fi ,~ure a e 743 mil l ion 
(1) The e~ York Her ld- Tribune . J a.rch 29 tt 1939. p . 17. 
(2 ) J ennys L. Ac, re stimony be f ore the .ouse Committee 
on Interst te a nd Foreign Commerce given ::Ia.r.ch 21., 
103 . Ref ..... rence bhe l f~ Vol o 13, r oo 2 ~ P• 27o- 79 .. 
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a year. Official s of the ra1.lroads, 
ho probably are ultrac.o.nservat1ve 
because o f their anta gonism to such 
a program, studied the estimate and 
reduced the flgure by two-thirds. 
But the savings attainable are un-
questionably gre~t a nd probably ap-
proach a. figure a s high a s ~~500,000,000; · 
a l though, for the reasons indica ted a c-
curate estimation 1s extremely diff icult. (l} 
Looked .. t most c onserva tively the annu l s aving would 
a ount t o a gre t deal; --the total net opere t1ng in-
come from a l l the r a ilroads ln 1939 amounted to only 
600 ,000,000. (2 ) 
One o f the first, arguments .dvanc.ed by those who 
are opposed t o consol idation is the labor a rgument. 
They hold that great numbers of former ~~ilroad em-
ployee s ould be left without jobs.. How true is t is 
a rgument nd wha t per cent of the tota l r a ilroad 1 bor 
suppl y :t1oul d be elim1n ted. · r .. Craven .ns ~·ere this 
1n h is articl e iq the At lantic ~onthly. He wri t es: 
(1 ' 
(2} 
(3 ) 
If the r a ilroads were oonsol1d3 ted into 
seven or eight ajor systems, it is 
probable tha t about 75.000 men would 
lose their jobs. Even if no dismissal 
oompens tion were provided, a.e uld 
not be the fact, such a loss of employ-
ment 1s not gre3. t compared ith that 
caused by the depression and dis-
organiza tion of the r a ilroa d bus1nessD 
as is shown by the f act that~ owing 
in p>l~t to the recent recession of . 
business a nd in part to a wage increa se, 
t e r a 119a y empl oyment from July 1937 
to June 1938 decrea sed from 1,174,000 
t o 914,000 or by a. bout 200.,000 men. (3) 
Craven. o 11 ~ailroads under Pressure., Atlantic 
'!onthly. December l938 p . 7o9. 
· .el len, J . H., Rai l road Conditions, p. 1. 
Craven, o, p. 772. 
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Perhaps, these 75,000 or 100,000 men could wo k 
1n the rec.ond1t1on.1..ng .or pl ant and equipment. . There 
1s littl e qoubt that t here 1s plenty of ork to be done 
in t his field of railroad transportation. The neglect 
of plant and equipment during the last ten years is al-
most unbel ievable.. Mr .. Cunningham, using figures of 
the ~eau of Railway Econoro1cs, states: 
During the eight years,l923 to 1930, 
incl usive. the average annual groas 
ca pital exP,3nditures of C.la.ss 1 rail-
roads 1'lere ·843.000,000. In the t'ol ... 
loqing eight years, 193~ to 1938, in 
e l usive, the comparable annual aver gc 
was '. 258,723.000. The gross .. oap1ta.l 
expenditures last year were ,226,937,000. {1) 
Furthermore, it is believed tha:t;,. uif consolidation 
:1nd o ord1n•.t1on are achieved 1n a period of rising 
traffic, it 1s improbable that xnuoh l abor will be 
displaced." (2) 
The result of the r a i l roads curbing their capital 
expenditures unduly has a depressing et"fect on the 
heavy industries. ~Vnen the r a ilroads oef. ae to buy, 
t hese indu tries beco e sluggish nd curtail opera tions; 
and this slo 11ng do\m, 11 railroad purchasing drops off 
enoufY1, is felt throughout the whole industrial o~gan1 ... 
zat1on. Thus, t.he railroads with their e:normous needs 
can by temporarily el1mlna t1ng and foregoing these naede 
cause repercussions throughout t..l}·e ·hole bus i ness struc-
(1) Cunningh m, . .; • J .. , e Present Railroad Oris is 
{Philadelphia, 1939) p. 23. 
(2) Fortune, August 1939, p . 84~-
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ture . Thut r a.1lroetds hove aer1::>usl y curta i l ed aap1-
t .al e xpend1tu.:l!'"es in the l a st decade$ a.nd thereby, no 
doubt, genera l ly ~tffeeted business oondi t i ons, i s 
sh own 1n the following t able .. 
3a~lr~ad Expenditures £or Fuel and 
Supplies :from 1928 to 1938 (1 ) 
1.11 f i gures 1n mil l ions {000,000 omitted) 
Ye .... r m •t S~nt Year m't. Soent 
1928 1,271 1934 600 
1929 1 ,,329 1935 593 
1930 1 .038 1936 803 
1931 695 1937 966 
1932 445 1938 600 
1933 465 
I n 1928 t he r a i l roads had nea r l y , 000 men 
wor king on the m 1ntenanoe of w y and s t ruc t ures; in 
1938 this figure stood at appr oximat ely 175,000. (2 ) 
In the t en yea r periOd t here wa s no a ppreols.ble deel1ne. 
1n s.ctive mil eage . Therefore, obviously t he r a i lways 
ae a system are negle~t~-.rv.; · t.he~r physi cal s truc t ure , 
(1 ) Chart compiled from figures given 1n the r eport o f 
the 6om1ttee of Six t o the President; da -ted -· c-
eml."x:fr 23. 1938. 
(2 ) Interstate Con:cnerce Com:n1es1on , Bure::.u of St at1et1cs , 
Series 1939, No. 8. Gr aphical Suppl ement 
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for want of funds. Each year tha t deprecia t ion nnd 
maintenance charges are ignored so much gre:_ ter is the 
financial burden for subsequent years. ·rhe r a ilroads 
h ave been most short-sighted 1n this neglect. . Under 
t h e direction and management of private ownership, t he 
r a i l r oads c an not and re not making any concert ed a t-
te. pte t o remedy the situation.. The condition of the 
r a i l r oads !n 1940 is worse than it was in 1933; a.nd the 
condition they wi l l fi.nd themselves in a. fe 'I years hence 
wi ll be one :rorse than the present condition. The 
n t.t.u-al con sequence is a constant decrea se 1n t he qua l -
ity of service poes1bl e 11 Dnd a constant decre9se 1n the 
proporti n of busine s s l ost t .o trucks a nd other ca r -
riers, which in tur n makes t he r a i l ro·; d situation even 
f urthe.r from soluti on . 
This r a ises the question o just ho much competi-
tion the r a ilroads have, and how it ha.s affected. them. 
There . 111 be no ~ttempt made to diseuse inl and ~ ·ter- . 
ways as competitor of the r a i l ys.. Obviously, t hey 
do compete wi th the r a i l r oads. but not to the ea.me de-
gr ee or with the same intensity a s do the other forms 
of tra.neport"' t1on. This f act i s borne out by the fo l -
lo ing st.-tement of ~r. Cunn i ngham.. He a Sserts: 
e steam r a 11ro·d ton- mi l e s in 1926 
were 75.41. of the tot al ; i n 1937 the y 
uere 64 . ~~ . The int er-c i ty trucks 
produced 3 .. 9,~1l 1n 1926 and 7. 7/:; 1n 
1937v e steamers. on the Grea t 
Lakes produced 15 . 2/ 1n 1926 an.d 
16 .. 6;: 1n 1937. On other inl and 
w ter~mye the product!on 1n 1926 was 
lo 6~ nd in 1937 it w s 3.0' Q 
The p1pe-11ne production Jumped 
f r om 3.~ t o 8.0fo . (1) 
..... oreover, our inia.nd a terwa.ya have oper ted 1n comp-
etit i on with t he r a 1lro de since t-he1t- very birth. 
The competition of the lnl nd water vays was not r uinous 
t o t.he r a i l aye . I t is onl y in the laet trNent,y ye~ rs, 
appr oximate l y, that competiti on from ot e:r newer f orme 
of t r ansport t i on has made large inroads i nt o the bue1-
neae of the r a.1lro de. The most important of these 
newer f orms have been t he automobile. the truck , t he 
bus 9 .... nd rnore recentl y, the plpe-line at1..d the aeroplane . 
Tc. king the privately ovmed ·a utomobil e first, it 
is difficul t to estimate to Just what desr.ee t.h1s type 
of passenger carrier ha s infl uenced the tre d of P 11 -
road. p .... ssenger tra ffic. As the 3ureau of Rail;r:ay .-:.:eo ... 
nom1cs st, ted : 
(1) 
. (2) 
The paseenger carrying phase of t rane-
por.ation presents some elements in 
marked contrast to the freight carry-
ing phase. the principal element oe1ng 
that the bul k of interurban passenger 
· movement in the United s t ates comprises 
tr ve l by individual s in their pr1v· te 
cars, and is n t gener ally commercial 
in nature. .. evertheless .~ a considera.bl e 
proportion of motor car travel is diver-
ted from the r a.1l way·a. (2) . 
Cunningham. ·: .. J .. , The Present Ra.1lroa.¢l .9.ris;p {Fh11ade l ph1a , 1939) Pu 26. · . 
tlllreau of Rai l way Econo ice, n Economic Survey of 
: .. o t or Vel11cl e 'l r a ns12ortation in the I!!:ked St:ttes 
( .aeh i ngton, 1933) p.. 2. 
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a.ny · people use their automobile strictly for 
pleasure whil e, perhaps, just a s m.ony utilize theirs 
a s n commercial transportati on vehicle. Although no 
c onclusive .figures can be clted, . there seems no doubt 
that . " t he private }:JUtomobile accounts in grea ter part 
f or the change in r a il p-a ssenger tr tfic .. " (1) 
To gain s ome p~.ot.ure of th1s change in p.~ssenger 
t .rafflc on our rail r oads 1n mich the a utomobi l e has 
been a domln nt f actor, t he t ollo 1ng table is pre-
aented: 
Hail1r1ay Passenger Data (1920-1938 ) (2 ) 
p esenger r:: ilea 'l'r a.velle 
Year Revenue bl ?as s . Train§. 
1920 1 ,304,814,000 574,826,000 
1925 1,064,806,000 581,791,000 
1 930 730 '765 ~000 545,090,000 
1931 551 .726r000 485.537,000 
1932 377,511 ,000 419,087,000 
1933 329,816,000 380,434,000 
1934 346,870,000 381,610,000 
. 1935 358,423~000 385,874, 000 
1936 4i;3,189,000 409,071.000 
1937 443,552,000 420,818.000 
1938 406.406 J 000 398,145 11000 
( 1) 
(2 ) 
CtW..ningh m, t e J. , The Present Railroad Crisis, 
(Ph11adelph1a, 1939) p . 29. · 
rhe ·i'or ld \lma.nac, 1940 ·issue p published by the 
.:!ew Yor k ';Jorld- 're l egram, p . 79 . 
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Thus with about a 30 per cent increase in popu-
lation over the last twenty years, passenger revenues 
for the railroads have dropped more than 30 per cent. 
The public does not travel less than it did twenty years 
ago; if anything, it travels more extensively. 
Equally as significant as the growth of passenger 
car travel has been the development of the motor bus or, 
more strictly, the intercity motor bus. "Between the 
years 1926 and 1937 the steam railroad proportion of 
total passenger miles fell from 75.2% to 52.5%. The 
proportion by inter-city busses soared from 9.2% to 
41.7%." (1) The following table will give some idea 
of the importance of intercity motor bus traffic as 
a factor in the changing railroad picture: 
Growth of Intercity Motor Bus Traffic (2) 
Total Revenue Miles 
Year 012er. Revenue 012era.ted 
1932 $185,000,000 . . 932,300,000 
1933 191,000,000 , 929,600,000 
1934 171,200,000 903,580,000 
1935 239,950,000 1,084,763,000 
1936 275,000,000 1,250,000,000 
-1937 298,000,000 1,259,000,000 
1938 234,510,000 1,256,600,000 
(1) Gunningham, W, J., P• 27. (2) The world Almanac, Issue of 194o, Published by the 
New York World-Telegram, p. 79. 
In refe·rence to the growth of intercity bus travel,. 
·it muet be· remembered that some of. tho change ha s been 
caused by the su1;)8t1tut1on or motor l:.)ueses for eleatrl-
cal ly opert ted cars. n'rhe 1nter-c1 ty e l ectric r a ilways 
suffered heavily in a decl ine (19a6-1937) from 11 .. '7% 
(of the t tal passenger m'lea travelled by all agencies) 
t o 2. 0}"::' . t.l ( l ) l~evertheleso, the In terata te Commerce 
Comm1ss!on 1n 1932 etatect, 1n refet•ence t o the r a i l roa ds • 
loss of pas senger business. "the effect of the loss of 
bus:tneee to motor veh1cles •.• 1s serious and will con-
t1nue t o be so after the revival of business. n !2J 
~r-·· e full mea sure of diversion of' pa,seenger tra r-
fie fr. m the railways to the bus a.ml the ,?.Ut,o is d1f-
f i eul t t.o dete · ·ina accurately. "fh.e following eta 1~e­
ment nffords c. ba sis for an estimation : 
In 1926 there were 19,.237,171 pas-
senger automobi l es and busses regis-
tered. The comparabl e number ln · 
1937 was 2.5 , 44?~924. (3) 
The Report of the Emergency .Board_to the ?resident . in 
discussing pa ssenger c o:npet1t ion, dealaree; 
ll) 
(2 ) 
(3) 
(4) 
R g1strat1on at passenger automobiles 
in 19}7 has increa sed 168 .. 4 p~rcent 
e1nee 1921,, ·while contrariwise the 
revenue of the r - 11 I ... oads from :oaesen-
ger traffic during the same period 
. decrea sed 61 .. 6 percent.. ~ ueh o:r the 
passenger traffic of the r a i l r•oada 
must be . r egarded as permanently di-
verted from the ralls. (4) 
Cunn1rur_,ham, l'i . J .. , p. 27. 
Interstate Commerce Comm1noion, Report ro., 18.2 i s-
sued Apr11 6 ·• 1932, p.. E78 .. 
Cunningham, :'i . J .. , p. ~6. 
Report of Emergency ·oard Appointed Septemoer 27, 
1938, p. 10. 
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The motor vehicle traffic which flows over the 
highways of the country is decidedly heterogeneous in 
character. Passenger car traffic predominates in 
numbers, but trucks while constituting a relatively 
small proportion of vehicular traffic, do nevertheless 
compete to a greater extent with the railroads in terms 
of revenue than do the former. 
Only a generation ago the railroads paid little 
attention to the potentialities of trucks. During that 
era: 
Intercity .•• truck operation hardly existed. 
The railroads had a net capitalization of 
$14,374,ooo1ooo; received a net operating 
revenue of ~2,812,000,000 and had opera-
ting expenses of only $1,881,000,000. 
Interest was met on almost all fixed 
obligations and dividends were paid on 
stock with an aggregate value of 
$5,412,000,000. (1) 
Road buildi~g and motor vehicle building were both pass-
ing through experimental phases. The use of public 
highways for purely commercial purposes had not at-
tained sufficient importance to cause any concern, what-
ever, on the part of the railroads. But, ·at present, 
the truck il one of the railroads' strongest single 
competitors. From 1926 to 1937 the ton-miles carried 
by the railroads _decreased 18.9 per cent, while during 
the same period, the ton-miles hauled by the trucks in-
creased 84.4 per cent. 12) 
r- (1) Hurd, w. J., Railroads fn the Red, Current History, 
July 193Sl p. 26. 
(2) Cunningham, W. J., p. 26. 
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It is almost impossible to gather informative 
and accurate data on trucking operations and acti-
vities because there are so many thousands of truckers 
and because the business they do is of such a complex 
nature. Concerning trucking data, Mr. Cunningham has 
stated: 
In an estimate of ton-miles by commer-
cial trucks in inter-city service com-
petitive · with railroads, for example, 
the only reliable data, beyond that 
furnished occasionally by traffic sur-
veys for limited sections of the country 
and limited periods of time, are the 
records of truck registrations by states. (1) 
In illustrating the effects of motor truck competition 
in their Report to the President, the Emergency Board 
states: 
Registrations of motortrucks, tractors, 
trailers and -semitrailers in 1937 num-
bered 5,275,281, an increase of 426 per-
cent over the similar figure for 1921. 
No figures are available to give tonnage 
hauled by these carriers, but the effect 
of the competition of the motor truck in 
one field--the haulage of livestock--can 
be illustrated. Of the total receipts of 
livestock at the 17 largest markets in the 
country in 1921 the railroads accounted 
for 94 percent, 6 percent being delivered 
by motor trucks and other incidental 
means of carriage. In 1937 the share of 
the railroads in this traffic had dropped 
to 48 percent, the balance of 52 percent 
going primarily to motor trucks. (2) 
It cannot be denied that similar happenings have taken 
place in other fields such as the automobile and the 
lumber to mention two. 
(1) Cunningham, w. J., p. 25. 
(2) Report of Emergency Board Appointed September 27, 
1938, p. 10-11. 
I:f one were to take 1926 a s an average year for 
Amer1ce..n business and a gree that both industrial pro-
duction and r a i l road t onnage be calculated as 100~~ 
for t hat year • the follo'~~1ng sign1.f1cant secular trend 
picture would appear .. 
Year 
1 926 
19~1' 
1932 
1937 
1938 
1939. 
A 
Comparison of Industrial Production Index 
to Rai l road Tonnage lnde;x (1926-39) (l) 
Ind. Prod. Railroad 'ron- • co i .o; 
Index na.ge I ndex Index 
.. 
lOQ;b 100 .• 0 100.0 
.... -:;.;;:· 
108.0 100 .. 2 92.9 
54.8 48.4 88.2 
96.0 76..:0 79 .• 3 
·74.3 57.8 77.8 
94.0 68.2 72.5 
Tonn .. 
to Prod . 
common complaint of the r a ilroads 1n regar d to 
c.ompe t1 t1on from motor trucks is th..'lt the motor c n.r-
riers have an unfa·1r ·advantage over the r a i l roads be ... 
c ause they do not pay their just share of the burden 
ot the building and upkeep of the highways t.hey use. 
Thus , they are a ble to chrrge much lower r ates than 
the xoa11roads beoauee .their overhead costa are a great 
(1) .5e l l en. J . H •• The Railroad Condition, p. 1. 
deal l ees ... The publ ic is pay.1ng a part of the charges 
f'or them. So the rail rot· ds argue. :in the ne nork re .... 
cently completed by .;1r .. Eastman after a six year study 
or the problem, he hol ds t he above v1e~-point to be 
f alse and manifestl y i mperfect: 
He holds that the r~1 1lro'"' d theory that 
h.eavy trucks ought to bear a larger 
share of the burden of the bu1ld1ng 
and upkeep of the hl§i1ways they use 
1s "patently unsound .. (1) 
Th1e is the op1n1on of a , n \7hose writings on t he r a1 -
r oad pr oblem have always been given respectfu1·attent1on 
by the transpor tati on agencies as 1ell as the gov rn-
ment bec""use of the honestyfl intelligence· and 1mpart1al1-
ty he ha s eho m 1n a11 his 1nveet1gat1ons. 
4nother 1mportapt compet.1t~r of the r ailroads 1s 
t he p1pe line used for the transport of crude oil nd 
other ~etroleum products~ P1pe l ines constitute a un1q~o 
and specialized transportation system developed b;>r the 
petroleum industry for its Ot"m use .. Pipe lines serve 
the oll J,nduetry in these thz~ee ways : 
1 .. by a s sembling crud.e o! l ~t central points 
for stor 2ge or shipment t o a refinery 
2. by trunk l ine shipments of crude oil t o re -
fineries or marine shipping 'terminals .. 
3 .. by long dl s tanae shipment of the princi-
pal refined product. gasoline. from fie l d 
or t1deuater refineries to t ank term1nalso (2} 
'l'he r - i l r oade compete with these p1pe l ines l.n the move-
ment of crude oi l t o ref1Iier1ee and ot the varloua re-
ti ) 
(2) 
Bost on He-ral d ., ...... d1tor:1al . r .. Eastman .. a Report 9 
Apx•!l, 1 6ll· 1940il p .. 10. 
· . .~.oulton •. H. G .. • The American Tr ansportation Problem. (ua sh1ngton, 1933) p. 701 . 
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This large increased development in the last ten 
years h a s been part of the growth of l.arge integra ted 
o11 companies such r s the St:1ndard 011 Company. Com• 
panles· such as these have set. up comprehensive trans-
porta tion systems of their own-. combining pipe lines;. 
t anJ:rers and trucks. The large increase in demand during 
th!s pe1 .. iod resul t1ng from expansion of the public 
ut111ty~ r a i l road, m9.r1ne and especially the automotiv-e 
1ndustr1em has greatly 1nfluene.ed. the amount of pipe 
l ine no 1n exist ence. The Emergency Board h a s found 
tha t: 
From 1931 to 1937 p1pe-11ne transportation 
of oil increa sed 94el percent.. The ex-
tent to \7hioh this m:e.Stna ()f transportat ion 
has taken over the shipment of petroleum 
products oan be ill ustrated by the fact 
that from 1921 to 1937 the production 
or crude petroleum 1n the United St ates 
increased 170.6 .percant' but the increase 
in the· amount of crude petroleum, pet-
r oleum oil&,. and .forms of gasol1ne eh1pped 
on t h e rai.lroads 11'lerea eed only 32 per-
cent. But even this f alls to tell the 
story on the ·d.t.vers1on of t -r affic· in 
petroleum and petroleum p:roducta .. (1) 
The reloc .. ting of nu ny industries and the various changes 
in the method.·s of distributing petroleum. products have 
combined to make such hauls, a s the ra.11roads malte., 
less in distance,. and ao leas profitable to them.. In 
addition , l arge trucks are engaged to a considerable 
extent in the d1 stribut1on of gasoline and other oils .• 
(1) Report .of Emergency Board appOinted September 27g 
1938. under Section 10 of the Railway .Labor HCt,. 
p. 10. 
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As compared 1th the railroads~ t he costs or pipe 
l ine operations · re relativel y lo mainly becau of the 
simplicity of oper t1ons and the comparatively small 
number or laborers required. Because ot t his the pipe 
line. presents a form of competition t o the r a i l r oads 
tha t they e an h ... ~rdly hope to cope w1th und.er any eir-
CU!llst ances. At most, tney can coopera te rzith t he p1pe 
l i leS in t.he shipment and distribution or oil . But in 
reg rd to recla i ming any share of the · pipe lines ·• re-
e~ipts5 the r ailways cannot hope to do so whe n coats 
of shipment v.~ ry so widel y ~tween t h e t o agencies. 
· .l\nother s wiftly developing trC'!.nsporta ·t1on agency 
1n ~o~.pet1t1on '< ith · the r a i l roa ds re the oom.rnerc1 1 
a.ir-U.nc . Al though a.1r transport 1s not fi- t !:'ir~esent 
one of the important am w _ 1 establ ished d1v1s1ons of 
our national transportation system, 1ts poten.t1al1t1es 
a nd its phenomenal growth 1n t.he last tew yea rs. al::e 
1t impera t i ve to consider- 1t a s ~ compet itor f .,t.he 
r a ilroads . Consider the domestic avia tion rec-ord of 
cont!nental United St ates : 
The number o f p e sengers carried by 
commercial airl ines ha s risen from 
5,782 in 1926 to 1 , 162,707 ln 1937 
and is certa in to 1ncre se to even 
greater numbers. Contrariwise. a ir-
pl.ne passenger f a res during the s ame 
period have been more thnn cut 1n 
half, but gross revenues .from pa ssen-
ger air traffic have risen trom 
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#6,973,000 in. 1930 to #26,690,00 in 1937. 
Express and freight carried by airplanes 
in 1926 was but 3,5555 pounds; in 1937 it 
reached a total_ of 7, 127, 369 pounds. 
Mail carried--a -profitable source of rev-
unue--has gone from 703,310 pounds in 
1926 to 17,706,159 pounds in 1936. (1) 
The accompanying table adequately pictures the . great 
strides made in commercial aviation in the middle 30's 
Figures are from the Norld Almanace for 1940; the Etlitor 
of the Almanac obtained his figures from the United 
States Aeronautics Authority. Figures are for December 
31st of years given: 
Year 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
- Progress of Aviation in the United States (2) 
(1933 - 1938) 
Passenger 
Miles Flown 
173,492,119 
187,858,629 
313,905,508 
435,740,253 
476,603,165 
555,719,268 
Passengers 
Carried 
493,141 
461,743 
746,946 
1,102,931 
1,201,707 
1,345,427 
Express 
Carried(lbs.) 
1,510,215 
2,133,191 
3,922,397 
6,958,777 
7,127,369 
7,335,967 
Although air transport is now the least important 
of all the forms of organized transportation now avail -
able to the public, its very swift expansion in th l ast 
(l) Report of the Emergency Board~l938, p. 10. 
(2) The World Almanac, Issue of 1940, published by the 
New York World-Telegram, p. 280. 
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few years warrants t.he v1ev1 that in time to come the 
c ommercia l viation industry wi ll be a. aer1ous compet-
1 t or of the r~~1lr ads.. '.'lith ea ch succeeding yea.r,. coste 
decline, s a fety increa ses and tra vel 1s S·. it"ter.. Thus 11 
in tla necr future more and more of the travelling and 
shipping _pub 1c will a vail themse ·lves of the a eropl ne 
as the cheapest. quickest and s afest means of tr<:t n s·--
portat1on . 
On a comparative basis ·the passenger reven e in-
or"' so h a been larger t han the freight revenue increri.se 
in the a ir transport a tion 1ndustryo I t woul d seem,there-
f o:re11 because of the nature of f light. and the premium 
it pl"'.ce e n compactness and l ightness. t ' a t tl9 !r 
ind.usl.ry will be a more stern competitor of . auri'ace 
tr n e x~t tion 1 _ the passenge r · ther than in t h e 
f'retght fie l d ... To comh3.t its infl uence. the r_ilroads 
. 111 be forced to o:ft~8,... premium service c;,'lt 1() cost 
t o offset ·;:,he speed e l ement tha t the aviation industry 
\7111 ---lH. ye b, abl e t o o ffer a.s in 1nduee.:ne-nt to ? .i.l 
ti' . vel lere. ~~o re tl1, n t h is the rai lr~onda ca n do l itt le . 
St t b1-1t,y of eervlce and convenience a re stil l on the 
a1deof the rail roads .. lhe aviation industry cannot 
o omp!lr e . ith the r a i l r oads 1n these factors.. In ·t.ime. 
it l e pr be ble ,. nevertheless, that they wil l overcome 
them.. 





58. 
'i ith the outlook as it i .e at, present,. many more govern-
ment loans ill be needed by the railroads 1f -they a re 
t o be kept from insolvency. The President of the 
Northern Faeiflc Railroad has recently stated: 
The condition of the r a ilroads is now 
such that, 1thout government help. 
e earmot go along much l.onger.. Al-
ready the government has a very con-
siderab e stake in the railroads of 
the United s tates.. Four hundred ele-
. van million d o 1r.u .. s are now owing by 
these properties to the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, and undoubtedly 
muoh more ill be o ing Wl.thln a 
short time. (1) 
And -~ .. Donna ly w$l s correct.. !~ore is owing the Re-
construction :':tnance Corporation from the railroads 
today~ Thuo" although opera ting as a. private industry. 
the r s.1l ways are a ·ssuming more and more the complexion 
of publ icly owned property.. The government i'lnde it-
self w1th a sizable interest 1n them ithout a t t empting 
to ac~uire ownership. 
A. br!ef presenta tion of the condition o the rail• 
r o"'ds of the United States 1a given 1n: .tho follov-:1ng : 
The present railroad situation may be 
summarized 1n the statement that ap-
prox.lmately one-thlrd of railroad 
mil e age is bankrupt and is baing oper-
a ted tor the c ourte by recebre:rs or 
trustees; appr ox1 ately one-th1ra of 
r a i l r oad mileage is hover.tng on the 
br1ro~ of bankruptcy; and onl y approx-
i mately ne-thir f r a i l roa d mileage 
(1) Donne ly:t c., Speech given before the American Rail-
way Engineer ing Aesoe1a.t1on, .. larch 16 ~ 1938. Re f o 
She l ... ol . 13 . No . 2 o P• 279. 
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is sa fel y solvent. In no period in 
r a ilroe.d h lstory has the d$gree of 
:t!na.ncial distres,e been as serious.. (1} 
Wb,y are sueh ~ le:rge preportion .Q.f the. railroads ln 
· bankruptcy·? One reason, as Thomas J,., McGrath• General 
Counsel f or the Brother-hood or Rai lroad Trainmen~ ex-
Pl- ined.~~ is : 
any ot the r a i l roads now 1n receiver-
ship 1'1nd t hemselves there largely be-
cause of the f act that they haY& top-
heavy capital etruc'turath ihe records 
.are repl ete 7>'1 th evidence showing that. 
· t h e :railroa.ds in times of prosperi ty, 
instead of retiring their obligations 
o :::- building up sinking funds to do eo!) 
have expanded their properties and added 
t o t heir f a c111t1ea.. Inst.ead. of making 
c a pita l inveatmEmte. out of sav1.ngs and. 
aurpl u.S th$y have .tesued 'bonds; and in-
stead of rat1r1ng bonds at ma turity, 
they have refunded them until 'their 
fixad ch~ges have beoome eo great that 
that the 1ncc me from r a tes currently 
preva111ngl' with the present. volume ot 
r a i l. r oad business, has toppled these 
cor!)orationa into ban..ltruptcy.~ (2) · 
'i.'he ra1lroads are nat ol)tal,n1ng a retl.lm on. tl1e1r 
c apit alize tion auff1c1ent t -o pay eV{,)fi the..ir fixed charges .. 
Theref'or0, being unable to attract. new private c apital. 
they h ave had to t ul"n to the go-vet-nmant for funds~ 
What has been their return? 
The a ver .nge return_:dur1ng the ln.st eight 
y~ars.- 1931- 193.8.,.fi'vla s slightly lens than 
2;:). Obv1ousl y-:a- :1 busi ness enterprise 
that earns such an inadequate return on 
invee,ted c:ap1to.l ca nnot 1ndef'1n1tal y 
( l. ) Cun~i:ngham ~~ ·;;~ . J .. I} The Freser1t Ra1lroa.d Crisis 
(Phi:..ade1ph1a 11 19;9) p .. 17.. -(2 } T~s~1mony *-lven befo:e th. House Comm1tt~e on I nter-
s t : r.e -:. n/l ~ o:r-eLgn CchU:!terce ~ ""a r ch 21 9> 19..:;~9/ 
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continue on that basis. The rail-
road funded debt which comprises · 
61% of the total capitalization, calls 
for interest charges of app~oximately 
4%. (1) 
Here is seen another weakness in railroad financial 
organization;--the high proportion that funded debt 
bears to total capitalization. On~ of the prime rules 
of business is that the owners should never borrow more 
money than they are willing to risk in the enterprise 
themselves. And yet, if the funded debt is 61% of 
of the total capitalization, the owners of the rail-
roads have borrowed nearly $ 1.60 for every dollar they 
have put into the property. 
But not only has the position of the stockholders 
become very precarious; also the bondholders themselves 
cannot secure their due charges. The following is a 
comparison of railroad interest due and interest paid: 
American Railroad Interest Due and Paid (2) 
(000 omitted) 
Year Int. Due Int. Paid Unpaid 
=---
1933 #498,021 427,649 70,300 
1934 471,864 392,111 79,754 
1935 469,587 367,473 102,114 
1936 449,911 340,253 109,658 
1937 446,288 344,368 101,920 
(1) Cunningham, w. J., p. 37. 
(2) Summers, H. B. and R. E., The Reference Shelf , Vol. 
13, No.2. , , p. 77. 
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default, the severe shrinkage in market value, and the 
prospective losses in reorganization When fixed i nterest 
bondholders may be forced to accept a part of the par 
value of their holdings in income bonds or capital 
stock, may bear heavily on thee~ institutions and ad-
versely affect the interest rate on savings banks de-
posita, the dividends on insurance policies, and the 
income available to colleges and other fiduciary ina~ 
titutions. "The amount of defaulted interest, 1930 to 
1938, is approximately $600,000,000." (1) · 
The shrinkage in market value of railroad securi-
ties has been severe. The following table is an average 
of the first-of-the-month prices of all railroad se-
curities listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The 
prices quoted on this exchange are a good indicator of 
the relative value, stability and earning power that an 
industry or business possesses: 
Average Prices of Railroad Securities (2) 
Preferred Common 
Year Bonds Stocke Stocks 
1930 94.20 74.91 99.74 
1932 59.04 21.30 23.52 
1934 74.22 29.54 37.25 
1936 81.70 . 39.78 46.06 
1937 81.95 43.52 49.50 
(1) Cunningham, L'V. J., p. 21. 
(2) Sorre 1 , L. C • , p. 276. 

Rail road 
Date of 
R'versh1P 
. _..,.. 
.:ilee 
.owra. teq 
.. lUl A.rbor Rai lroad ~ .• -~ ............ " .. ~ .. 1931 294 
I1ssour1-Ill1no1a .. , ....... . .......... 1933 .93 
Pittsburg. Shawmut & _orthern ••••• 1905 191 
Ne •1 Orleans. Texas Mexico .... .,. .. .. .. • 1933 ~91 
Akron$ Canton & Youngstown ......... ; .... 1933 :t71 
Beaumont,. Sour Lal:te & ¥estern • ., ~.. • 1933 146 
Spo.ka.Yle Intern.at1onal ............. H •• 1933 164 
Ne?. York» Susql.lehanna & ~ estern ... • • 1937 143 
The fo l lowing. tabl e is nt~de up of r a i l roads whose 1938 
earnings did not cover even their fixed ohare;ea: 
Railroads hose 1938 Es.rn1ne;_ s did not 
Cover F1x~ .. Ch rges · ·(1) 
1938 % of Fixed 
Railroad Gross Revenues Ch'ges Earned 
Ne York Central ... . ....... . .... . 
Southern :Paa1f1c ·• . . ....... q ... ... .. . 
Baltimore & Ohi o ..... ,. ....... .,. . .. .. 
*'Chi.c go , ~1ilwaukee & St .. 
Paul ., _ .. . ~ ................... v • . o. ••• . ~ 
southern · Ra tl 1ay .. .... . .... o ... ... •. ~- . 
*Chicago & Northwestern ......... . 
* ~1ssour1 Pac1f1a ...... ~ . ., .... . .. "• 
*Chicago. Rook leland & 
Paclf!o ...... ~·~· .. ·······~.o~~ 
~: .. ~ •. Y ... • '4• H .. and Har-t,ford . . ... . 
......... Erie ... •-. 4 .. '*C)· .. ... o .. . ... .... "'4t o .... ~ 
orthern Pacific ........... ~ .... ~ •. 
St ... Lout.s-So.n Francisco ...... . 
Delaware~ Lackawanna & 
\1est,arn C) ..... o .. 'Q ..... o • 9 ....... ~~~ ....... .. 
AtlanM.c Coa.st Line ., . ............ . 
J ... ehigh /a.lley .. .. ....... . ~ " .......... . 
.;• ... rre .. ba.sh • • 0: • o.· •• ••• •• 0 · •• ~ oO ~ .. o .. . , 
Beeton ~a1ne ·•~·· ~· ·•o••••• · 
*Seaboard Airline ••• ., .. ~······ 
New Yor k, Chicago & St ~ 
Lou1·s .... ia • -.- ... . ... .. . ......... $ "' v .... . . 
Centra l of' :New Jersey ........ . ~. 
1Baoui .. i; Kansas & Te:xae ...... . 
:Per :r r quette ........ ., ........... . 
(c.onttnued.} 
~298 ,,681.000 
200 •. on.ooo 
1}4. 722. .• 000 
. 99.416.000 
. 89.419.000 
81,.056,.000 
80,749 •. 000 
77.778-.000 73Boao.ooo 
·69,509,000 
51,022,,000 
45.108.000 
. 44, 188,000 
44.H54,000 
41.-230.-000 
40.472.000 
40,193.000 
40.010,000 
36,.381,000 
29,.252.000 
27,858.000 
25.447,000 
59 
. 78 
59 
41 
97. 
.. . ·a 
30 
21 
16 
25 
10 
10 
49 
71 
55 
20 
31 
19 
85 
12 
26 
33 
(1) '1/h .. t Ra i l r oads ~ade l(oney. Business i7eek, .Jaroh 
11. 1939. p.; 44 . 
* In Reee1vorsh1p 1n 1938 
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Railroad 
*Denver & Rio Grande Western ••• 
Long Is land . . • • • . • . . . • . . . . •.••• 
Deleware & Hudson ••......••..•. 
*StLouis & Southern •••••.•••.• 
Grand Trunk Western ••......••.• 
*Chicago Great Western ••.•..• :. 
23,404,000 
23,308,000 
21,199,000 
18,492,000 
18,272,000 
17,142,000 
8 
defic it 
96 
69 
deficit 
38 
Many are the over-capitalized railroads now unable 
to meet fixed charges because the actual value of the 
physical equipment is a gre" t deal smaller than 
that which is listed in the accounts. Another weakness in 
the valuation figures lies in the fact that genuine allow-
ance has not been made f9r physical property which is 
wholly or partially obsolete; property which is still car-
ried as an asset in the investment account but is neither 
used nor useful. What this obsolete or unused property 
amounts to in per cent of book value for all the rail-
roa ds in unknown and cannot be accurately estimated be-
cause the degree of obsolescence and the extent of unused 
.facilities and equipment are not uniform on all the 
railroads. 
Another serious difficulty in the financial condition 
of the railroads as a group is that t here is practically 
no accounting reserve for depreciation and .obsolescence 
in way and structures. A report of the Interstate 
Co~nerce Commission states: 
On the combined balance sheet of class 
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I ~ailroada, t>aeember 1 , 1937. the in-
vestment 1n road and structure was 
."·1.3,879,.000.,000 and the accrued de-
preciation was only . 124,ooo.ooo, or 
0.90;~ or the 1nve,stment. (1) 
Bec!?,use funds for deprec1a.t1on and obsolescence are 
so ins1gn1tlc ant on fixed prope rty~ the investment 
accounts of the r ailr oads· ap pe ar ·ao much the · ·ore 
O'.;a:retated. Instead of clt.~rg11'_lg aubstant1'"' 1 p;•rts of 
net income each ye, "t.' to add!.ttons and be-tterments, re-
pairs and repl~cemente, the r ai l ro-da financed t hese 
needs from the funds aQqu1red by the s ale ol' additional 
I 
securities; for the most part these have been bonds. 
Capital stock 1as 1mpoee1ble t o market.. Thus fixed 
char gee uere raised higher· and higher with no increases 
1n arn1ng power. The relation between fixed ~barges 
and operating revenue over t he last twenty yenrs 1s 
etgn.1f1c-nt: 
In 1921. 11 ... 2.. cents ot every doll r 
of opera ting revenue ent to pay .fixed 
charges • the average for the period 
1921 t o 1929 ba1ng 11.0 oents. the high 
.nd low points being 1.1 . 3. cents 1n 1922 
nd 10.2 cents 1n 1923. From 1931 to 
1937, ho ~ever_, ~hie aver age rose to 
17.9 cents • the high -snd l.o points 
baing 21.9 cents 1n 1933 and 12.9 cent.s 
in 1930.. In 1937 this figure stood at 
15.4 cents. (2) ' 
Some writers say that proportion of fixed charges to 
oper !l tlng revenues rose only to the degree that oper-
ating revenues ent domt.. But this is not true: 
(1) Interstate Commerce Commission Report~ No .. 42 .. ~ 
1937, p. 12 
{2) .!."t&J.."'I t ot Eme-rgency Board , 1938. P• 15. 
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Operating revenues f or the year 1929 (the beat ye:J r 
of the per·1od 1921-1929 ) were · pproximately 5 1?J bet.t er 
th n those of 1937 (1929: . 6,~ao.ooo,ooo; l9,r,r : ·4.261, · 
. '. . ; 
000,000 (1) ) .. Yet fiXed ,char ges 1n rela t_on t,o oper-
. . 
a ting revenues f .or the period 1930 to 1937 a:aer. . ·gad 
about 63% higher than for tne . erlod 1921 to :f929; (as 
previously polnte.d out 11.0 cents was the avert ge amount 
of every dollar of opera ting revenues t hat .vent for fixed 
aha.rges in the period 1921- 1929; v :!l e in the r1od 
1930- 1937. t,b.e aver age amount wa.e !7.:.2 cents ) . · 
. Aa a result of securing replacement ana repair ·funds 
thro·:ue;h. bonds : 
Ra.1lroada have too much money invested 
in them. 1th oper tinS revenues 
y1eld1ng vir-tually no profit, they must 
try to carry ca pital securities estim-
ated by competent authorities to be 
' 22,000,.ooo.ooo of which f12.ooo.ooo,.ooo 
repree·ente bonds. debentures and t.ruet 
oertitiea.tea requiring f'ixed interest 
payments ... (2) 
This la-rge funded debt ha lit~le or no rotll~ment pro-
V1 e1one behind 1t 1n t .he general railroad financial 
org!?.n1zat1on.. S1nk1ng funds are compar " t.1vely un-
known in railway accounting except wh&re the Interstate 
Commerce Oomm1sslon re.qu1res an accrual .v A:t maturity 
the general practice has been to re:fund the bonds by a 
new a..111d usually larger issue. Little ef·r.ort has ever 
(1) rellen, J .. . : . , 1'h.e Rail road Cond1t1on. p. 1. 
(2.) Hurd,. Cf# W .. , Railroads ln the R'ed• Current Hlst.ory.lt 
July 1939-Vol .. 50. p .. 26. · 



The long looked ; for improvement in railroad t .raf-
:fic has not come about~ 1939 was f'orcen.st. as a good 
rail r oad year, perhaps, the beginning of a. new and 
prosperot.ts era for the railways. But during the first 
11 months o f la-st year (1939), the na tion ' s Class I 
r ailro:- de had a net ineome o:l only ~. 57 .260,000 (1} as 
compared 1 th an .average o f' :; 90 ,072.,00 ror the depression 
ye are of 1935~ 1936 and 1937. \.lth a deficit of over 
181 m1111nn- f or the firs~ 6 months of 1938, and a high·~ 
er nve!"'! ge net 1noome for 1935-37 than for 1939. 1t is 
logic.:..l t o conelu t hat the railroads' poeiti'm is 
grow1ng :f'!nancially worse with each succeeding year. On 
such a basis. 1940 111 prove to be a poorer year than 
was 1939. This constant down- s t1lng cannot go on forever. 
The f a te of the r> :i.!lroade under their present eet·-up 
aee~e doomed•''' 'fhl\l e. certain courses or action httve 
proven temporarily helpful t.o the railroads~ they hf. ve 
been merely p!\lli.r t1ves.. ,fu _ t is needed 1s •1 cure. 
There see e to be no escape 1rom the ultima te expedient 
of government ownership · nd oper2t1on for the rallroadso 
Corpo:t':lte 1nd1v1dual1sm 18 no longer effective ·or ef-
ficient in the operation of the railroads. :PoJ.lcles 
· ;rh1oh a ppe · 4 detens1 ble in the f ormer daye or onop ... 
oly are no longer defens1bleo Bankruptcy and reorgan1 
. (1) The Worcester Telegram. ~1lro,, d Income April 16, 
194-0. P• 12. 

Chapter V 
How JOuld. Government, 0 mership Function 
Most of the civilized nations o~ the world have 
h ad some degree of experience with government ownership 
and/or government operation of their r a ilways.. A cgm-
pilat1on a s of 1936 which a ppears in the Univel'aal 
!rectory ot Railway Officia ls and Railway Yearbook 
pl aces the total amount of government o ·med r a1lw y 
mileage at 345,419 miles, a.nd the total of both govern-
ment and privately owned railways at 788,551 miles. {1) 
Using these figures as. a basis. ·the government-
owned r a 1lroa.d mileage. consisted of about 45% of a ll 
t.he Y'a.1 lro~d mile~: ge 1n use throughout the 1]'0:t .. l d a t 
the t1rne. At pr esent , th figure ts, pert1aps, about 
the aarrte. But due to boundary changes, ars 9 ne - con-
struction, abandonmente. 1nacurrate figures etc .. 11 t 1.s 
difficul t to compute exact l y the proportion of govern-
ment-owned r a ilroads as compared to the compl ete amount 
1.n uee. No doubt. it can be accuratel y placed at. some-
/here between 40 ind. 50 pereent of the tota l railroad 
m1lenge--some writ era cla\_il 1t to be forty percent while 
o t her pl; ce it closer to fifty~ 
( 1 ) Un1vers ·1 Directory of fb.ilwa y Officia ls and Ra ilway 
Yearbook, (Nen York, 1937) P• 62. 
Yet given the approximate figures on the amount 
or government -owned and privately owned r a ilways. it 
is still quite 1mposs1ble to compare the rela.t i ve 
magn! tude of the two methods or operation: --mile ge 
lone does not tell the rhol e ·story. Ra1l~y 1leage 
is not necessarily a unit or measurement capable of 
indicating the 1rllpo~ance of government- owned r o.ds 
in reference to privately owned roads. One reason why 
miles of road opera ted is not a completely sufficient 
yardstick l ies in the f act that government r a ilroads 
in a number of countrle~ have much denser traffic than 
do the privately owned r a ilroads in thoee same countries. 
he r ,ai l r oads of diff erent t.1one ,grea t l y vary in th1s 
r-espect . Therefore, a mileage f1gUl"e alone . 111 not 
measure or compare the two methods ot operation ae ca r-
riers of traff ic , a .e labor employers. as markets for 
the investment o'f capital. or as cust·omers of th., ba tUc 
industries of a nation .. 
The l ate Sir Wi l liam Acworth, the em1 ant ·. it!sh 
r a i lway authority, testifying before the Senate Com-
mittee on Interet te Comm.erce in 1919. expressed the 
opinion that pr1v9tely owned railroads embodied r oughly 
about t o~thirds or the total capital 1n all railroads 
a.t that time; and these roads carried about two-th irds 
of the rail borne traffic. (1) These figures, tQday, 
t 1 ) Sorrel, L. C., Government Ownership a.nd Oper2t1on of 
Railways f or the United States~ (Ne 7 Yorlt, 1937) 
p. 213. 
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woul d. require .revision in f avor or government opera t .lon; 
government-o .med rail wa y m1.leage has been increasing 
steadil y since 1900. 
In As1a . Africa , A,ustral1a and 1n the grea ter part 
ot Vur~pe government ownership predominates, while in 
t he Uni ted St a tes. the United \trngdo~~t Argentina and 
Spain pr l va.-tel y owned ra.il we.ys aJ'e distinctl y in t he 
majorit y.. 'l'he follo 11ng tabl e is " comparison of st t e 
owned c.nd p!'iv tel y cnmed r~ ilr oade 1n tbe latter na t-
ions: 
Government and :Pri.va tel y Owned Ra1lv;ays 
i n t he United St ates,. Great Britain , 
Argent1na and Spain (1} 
Coun t l"l Tot al Iuile~s;e State Owned 
United St t:?.tes 259,740 1881 
Great Brita in 20.,080 ..... 
Argentina 26,531 6365 
Spa in 10,350 177 
% 
St a te 01.:-med 
0.9 
• • o· 
24 •. 0 
1.7 
These :four countries a re t he onl y ones in the world 1n 
\'7hich pr1vr te owners c ontrol the gre t er p - r t of the r a 11 -
ro::r.d .mi l eage . Thr oughout t he rema inder of t he world . t he 
state cont.rol s more of t he r 1lroa.de than do private 
owners . As of 1936 the Universal Directory of ~ 11 ay 
(1) Sorrell , L. c. , Government Ownersh i p a nd Oper, tion 
of t he Rai l\ a ye f or the Unl .ted Stutes~~ (He w York p 
1937) p. 216. 



Yet the proport1onsh1p bet ueen government and 
privately o 'Jned r ailways 1n terms of: mileage shoul d 
n ot be accepted a s indicating the relative cmp1ta l 
c ontributions of governments a nd private capitnl1ste 
to the rai~roads ., o·r a s indicating the extent or govern-
ment participation in the management of many privately 
0 rm.ed r c 1lro!ldS. 
t, 1xed prlva te and government c.a.p1tal1sm exists 1n 
the c ase of a number of private roads and in some govern-
me nt c ontrolled roads . Governments often hold eeeur1-
tias of private r a i lways and have 1n many instancee 
contributed large sums to t helr construction ~nd develop-
ment in the f orm of ca sh a nd land subsidies,. or through 
t he ex.teneion of governm.ent credit.. Some governments,. 
by virtue of their position a s guarantors of interest 
and dividends on priv·, te r a i l 'Jay securities• can often 
exere1se extensive influence upon the private manage ... 
ment of t hese r oad a. Such wa s the case in zil. 
In any study of government ownership and oper t1on 
of r a i l r oads 1n ·Other na tions throughout the worl.d,. 
there will be f ound many advantages a s wel l ae many 
d1saoirantages att.'?ched to such a system. One may polnt 
t o t he evil s; or one may stress the benef1tso One point 
t.h.~·t m1.ght be empha sized, ho [fever. 1s that, world- over., 
t here 1s no preva111ng tendency t o abandon .government 
ownership or government operat.ion~ a lthough t here has 
been,. 1n many instances, a tendeney to change and modify 
the existing form. 
In other countries publ ic •chmershlp and operation 
h a s been adopted for the moat part for reasons o.t ex-
pediency ,. and not a s a. matter or princ1.pl e.. any govern-
mente have been f orced into ownership bec-ause private 
enterpri se has been unabl e to either undertake the task, 
or t o carry on once construction has been comple~ed. 
Government o ~ership 1n Austral~~ and Norway 
i pt ..... t ed by conditione similar to these. 
s prec-
ometimes , mi l itary ooneider . .:.t1ons h ve brought 
about g vernment ownership as 1n Fr ance and Germany. 
The U..'l 1ll1.ngness t o rel y upon foreign cap1t 1 h as 
c aused some nations t o underta ke the o mership .nd 
opera tl n of its r ailways., e.g. Belgium .. 
c ause of this grea t variety or underl ying mo-
t i ves , 1t would be idle to me sure tbe results wholl y 
by the test of earnings.. In ca ses where a nat1on•s 
welf:: re prompted sta te o mersh1p of the r ailways, little 
thought a.e given t o ea rnings or proflts.. To pre-deter-
mine t he success or f 11ure of government ownership 1n 
the United States it is of l ittl e consequence to exain1ne 
th1e. mG:t.hod 1n other nati ons . Firat of all, conditions 
1n no other country in · h1ch governrnent ownership exists 
par~llel conditions as t hey a re in t h is country. And 
secondly~ merely poi nting out evil results under govern-
ao .. 
ment ownership !s of l it"tl• value; it 1s a r a ther 
simple L:J. t t 0r to as 10emble an array f pol itical and 
financial evil s from the history of our own r a ilroads. 
Lastl y, t h ere is no other nation in the :10rld whose 
r a i l ay system 1e a s large, a s complicated ,. or a e im-
portant to 1t a s ours is to us. The immediate quest ion 
is whether ev11 e a s t hey exist under either system can 
be eliminated~ The ultimate question is which system. 
rhen ful ly sa.tegU: irded, will produce t he better resul ts. 
Therefore, 1t is of little use to present f acts 
and f i gures on government o mersh1p and. operation as 
it exists elsewhere. o conclusive arguments can be 
discovered. There a re, ho Never. two very .famil i ar 
instances or sta te ownership and operation which are 
often used a.e a rguments against public ownership and 
operation of the rai l?.ays of the United StB.tee. 
The first of' these is t he Canadian National System 
as contrasted to the privately owned Canadian Pacific 
System. mhe other ls the operation of our railroads by 
the fade 1 governm.ent during the Great ~Jar.. How strong 
an argument for private ownership and operation these two 
instances present remains t o be seen .. 
From the standpoint of government ownership in the 
United States, more interest att nchcs to the Can·dian 
railroads than to any other country's railroads because 
.. 
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of the geograp~11cal sim1lar1t1ee; and also because or 
tho sh. .. i a.r1ty of the 1nst1 tut1one 1n the t o countries 
iss 1 to make for a more equ1t ble oompar1sion ~han . 
is offered by any other coutltry 1n ~hiah public owner-
ship exists. Canada. and the nited. Sta tes a re both 
young n~ tiona still 1n a. period of expane1on;. both are 
bu11t upon traditions o.f private enterprise; :and both 
are democr tical ly governed~ 
-rci'urthermore, it is held that within the Dom1n1on 
there is .r..ad an example of government a nd private enter-
prise xletlng side by side., and unde.r condit ions that 
allow co p~ r1«bn. The t :iO systems eompetG ·alth each 
other througn ut the grea ter part ot t he e untry. '.there-
t ore, say the analysts,. we oa.n e s11y discover whether 
priv"'te or public ownership of the r a ilroads is t he 
better a nd more efficient form. : ·e need simply to 
study the records of the Canadian .a.'la.t.1onal Syst.e as 
oomp9.re~ to those of the Oanad1a.n Pao1f1c • 
• .,.any factors enter 1n .• however., that make the com-
par1eon -between the Canadia n 1.ration'""'l nnd the Canadian 
.Pac1.f1e a poor and unjust one .. Let us examine the two 
systems •. 
In Canada t~ere a re t~o grea t railroad systems 
which t ogether own nd operate about ninety three per 
cent of the ratl·-m.y lines or the nation, (1) as well as 
(1 Fournier. L~ T e~ Railwax Nat1ona11zat1on inCa~ 
cmoronto . 1935) preface, p. vi1. 
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eons1derabla mileage 1n the United. Sta tes. The Cana-
dian Pa . i f1a ts privately owned and operated ana hae 
about. 17 j-OOO m1lee of track; the Canadian National., 
the government's system. is the l arger and operates 
approximately 2L~,ooo m1.1ee of track.. (1) 
The Canadi n N t1onal System was organ~.zed in 
1917 ::ul a result of the collapse of a period of 1n-
dust.r1a., expansion which leJt a great. number or the 
les-e f1na.nc1al l y se-cure railroads 1n serious d1ff1cul-
t1e~J., The World war had f ound Canada wlt.h an over- ex-
panded .. r a ilw y devel opment involving huge sums of money. 
This 1nv,estment ?-S represented :tor t.he moat part. by 
interest bearing seour1t1ee.. The burden of these 1nter-
e .st p.."='.yments a e greatly out of proportion to the pro-
ductive oapa.e1ty of the newer. 11nes.. Some remedy wa.e 
1 pera t 1 ve 1t these rail roods were to be kept open to 
the publ ic. The -Qnly practical remedy~ govern.'!!ent 
o nerah1p. 'tYaS eho _en. As Fournier put a 1t; 
.~.he a.cqule1t1on <>f the :proooe~t1ea (of 
the over-exp..~nded roads) by th$ Doni1n1on 
Government avoided oankruptcy and the 
reduction ot _interest bea ring aeeur1 t -1es 
•vh1ch would,. have .tollo ;ed. Th.e burden 
was shifted t o the people o":' uun<ida; 1 .. ~~ 
t.he cost. ot the over expansion "'Jae borne 
by the people_. and not. one dollar of in-
d~bt~dnesn was defaul ted. {2) 
(l) Fournier, L ... T., Ra1lw~y Nat~onal1zat1on in Canada 
(Toronto-a 1935) ~ p ... -tff .. 
( 2) Ibid. 6 p. 7 .. 
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The previously existing private systems acqui red 
by the government between 1917 and 1922 and which now 
comprise the Canadian National Railways are: (1) 
The Canadian Northern Railway System 
The Grand Trunk Railway System 
The Grand Trunk Pacific System 
The Canadian Government Railways are also a part of the 
Canadian National System, but this line had been owned 
by the government long previous to 1917. 
This creation of the Canadian National Railways 
marked the beginning of an experiment that was more or 
less unique in railway history. To be sure, private and 
nationalized railways exist together in other countries. 
The distinctive feature of the Canadian situation lies 
in the fact that the two railroad systems parallel each 
other from the Atlantic to the Pacific; they are in active 
competition for traffic at every important business cen-
ter. Two distinct problems arise out of this condition. 
The first is the problem of administration of a govern-
ment -owned system of railways in a democratic country. 
And the second problem arises from the relatively un-
controlled competition of two large commercial railway 
systems, representing widely different principles of 
ownership. 
(1) Fournier, L. T., p. 3. 
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It must be remembered 1n any .comparison of ~overn­
ment a.nd private r,1lwa.y opera tion in Canada that the 
Dominion Government became the owner of a railroad 
system not a.s the result ot a definite pol1"' j· , , th t. 
end; but r_thar as the outcome of a long series of e-
ventg wh1oh practically forced the government to a ssume 
cert in railroad lines. Also , the l ines that the govern-
ment wa s obliged t o opera te 1ere not the strong well-
entrenched s:vetems easil y able to ride out a crials .. 
The roa.ds the government · f ound itself owner o were the 
-.:1e l e r ones-the first to fee l the pinch of increasing 
costs and decreasifl revenuef:ll .,. In short, the Can dian 
government f ound itself the O·wner of the poorer r-ailroads 
c onua 1ned within its border-e. In t he worrta of 1: . ·.;- • a l 
Co .m1ee1on of Inquiry: 
Government ownership of r a i lways on a 
l.:.rge scale a s a national policy a s 
not c ontempl ted or planned by any 
Government and was not submitted :tor 
adopt i on to the people of Can ·~ .... 
By a combination of cont ractu 1 ob-
11gat1one and parliamentary measuree .11 
the c ountry 11ae projected into the 
ra1l\'1ay.s business on a 1 rge sec le,. (1) 
Further, 1t must be kent 1n mind that Canad 1s 
a country of continental dL1ensiona, nea.r l y four thou e-
nd mi les from coast to coast \d th a small population 
of about eleven and one- half million i n the main scat-
tered along the southern strip or its vast area. For 
(1) Re Port of the Royal.Comm1se1on to Inquire into 
H ... !i1lwaye a.nd l'r .,.nsportat1on in Canada, 1 931 - 1932,. 
p.. 13~ 
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such country, with a population chiefly agricul tural , 
and produc1~~ so much for export, chea p tr_nsportat1on 
i s a necess ity. This, coupled with the fact that nn 
optimistic attitude preva iled previous to t he ' orld 
'Jar in regard t o Can da 's 1lll!-ed1ate growth~ led to the 
over-expansion at the r a 1lro_ds. Canada's po_ula t1on 
per mile or r a 1lrmy 1e t h e smallest of any country in 
t he 1orld» Hungerford at tee of the population of t he 
Dominion relative t o the population of the United 
States : 
._.regards popul t1on, Canada h ~ s only 
5 .: r equ re 1le, a s com red with 41 
p- r• eq re mil e ln the United St ates .. 
~he: population per mile or r .. 1l.<r_ y 1n 
Can "da. is 240 a s co pured .i 500 in 
the nlted St a tes ••• A 1. rge p oport1on 
of t he mi l eage In t h e . e st must still be 
considered poineer or coloni z.ation t•ail..-
my c on tructed in advance of set tlement. (l) 
._;1nce, a.-s previously stated. the anadi -n National 
and the Can dian Fa.cif1c control over ninety per cent of 
all the r , 11 r~ cil1t1es serving this s parsely settled 
area ; since they are rea sonably equal in size; s1nc'9 
the y opero. te r oughl y over t 1e same a rea ; and Eli!lce they 
make the ea. e chargee f or service, t1ey are fraquently 
ci t ed as providing a basis or c omparison bet een govern-
ment and private O\mersb.1p. However, in such a cit .tion 
there are many inequalities t hat ust be c onsi dered. 
(1) Hul'!gertord, J . s., Cana.di n national Rai l a.ys, nnal s 
o .!. 'he Amer i can :-\Cademy of Pol1t1cal and Socia l 
Scieneej) Vol .. 187, September, 1936, p .. 159. 
First. 1noo.far as 1ts trans<lont1nental lines are 
concerned, the Canadian Nat1ono.l 1s some what l eas rav-
orab1y situated than the Canadian Pacific. The Canadian 
P~c1 ·1c ae t he fir~t to be c nstrueted and rme built 
tor most of' 1te. length from the Great Lakes to the 
Pa.c:!:t1c no·t f <;;) r north of tho border of the United St a tes 
whe.re population 1a more dense than 1n a rea s further 
north. The Canadia n Nation l ta tranocont1ne.ta~ route 
1s f urther north vihere even now t here is little popula-
tion to support a r a i lroad. A. second 1nequaltty 1s to 
be fo~~ 1n the fact that the Canadian National con-
s1ste al. oat enti l"e1 y or l i nes which, when oper~I t1ng. a s 
pr!v;.....t .. e r ads, were un~ble to earn expenses. · hes(;t roads 
were appropriated by the Dominion government only to 
o.vo1d s uspension of oper t 1,,ns. 'i'he th!r.d 1neqt.ml:1t.: spring 
from the capital structures of the two ra 1l~aye. The 
Canadian Jatim .. a. l ma a. he"".".TY capital burden; ite out-
standing stock.s and bonds average ne::. rly .35 per cent 
more per mile than those of the Canadian Fac i f1a.. The 
accompanying tabl e gives 't he ca.p1t.a11zs:tion t'i~'uree: 
Relative Capit-alization ·of Oa nadla n at-
tonal andCanad1an Pao1f1o {1937) (1) 
Canadi an 
Pacifi c 
Outstanding stock .. .. • • . • • • • . .. ~1804~ 341,000 
Outstanding bonds ........ ~ ...... 237,415 11 000 
Total capitalization ............ 1,040.757:'1000 
Cupital per mi l e of road~- · · · 62~000 
Canadian 
.. ,. tionaL 
~: 964, 04o. 000 
1 ,.032, 756,000 
1,996,769,000 
84,000 
(1) Summersg n. B .. and R. l; ,. , The· Reference Shel f!) Vol . 
13~ \Jo .. 8. p .. 45• 
'Ihls heavy capital burden o:r the Ga.nadia.n :National 
Rail ;;ays 1s not the resul t of governmental 1neff1c1en.cy • 
or governmental mts-management... The government of Can ... 
ada as handed th1~ heavy debt -WlUtn ·-tt as.sum~d own-er-
ship of t he near banlr.rupt roads. This debt has not been 
reduced; interest charges have been paid each year .. It. 
1e sa.id that the Canadian - 8.1t1onal is over-capitalized •. 
Th1s may be true; but whether it 1-8 or not ·has no bear-
1ng on the question at hand--Is: the Canadian go· - 'i .. ment 
operating their railroad syst~m as c·ompetent l y _and ae. 
eff1o1ently as the c n dian P.ac1"'1e 1s being oper -·toed 
under private mtn;l.gement .. 
There is one other 1tem th .t should be mentioned; 
one !Jh!ch seems little reoogn.tzed by wrJ.t.ers on the eub-
ject of t he Canadian Ra.ilroadsv _ This detail !s the re• 
lative amounts of cash subsidies and l and grants g i ven 
to the Canad1an National and the Canad1an l?acific ays-
temE, by Dominion~ provincial and mun1o1pal gover.nmrnts. 
Totals to December 31, 1938 are as fo l lows: (All f1guree 
are t aken from a report of the. Domini on Bureau of 
Stat1st1cs~--
Land Grants and Cash Subsidies t .o Canadian 
Ra1lr oads t o December 31, 1938 (1) 
Cash Subs1d1es L and Grants {acres ) 
,_ 
Total Per Ule '.total Per !1le 
Ca.n ::ld1an Pacific ...... ~116li'oss~ooo 7,000 36,956.000 2 .• 000 
Canadian National lit .•• 88.495,000 311000 7 .,578.000 321 
(1) Summers, H. B. and R. E., Vol. 13, No. 8, p. 45. 
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Therefo~ .  to use the Ol'GiB of the Royal Comrni:s• 
slon o·f 1932: 
Government ownership oi ra1l~tays on a 
large scale as a nationa l policy was 
not contemplated or planned by any 
government and. wae not su'bln1tted for 
adoption to the people of C&nada. 
But in 1917, hen the government re-
fused to permit the Canadian Pacific 
Railway com~~ny to negotiate for the 
majority ,shares of the Canaci1an North-
ern, there was practically no ·eacape 
from government ownership of all the 
rail aye now comprised ''1 thin the 
C ad1an National Rail ay System. 
The conse uent completion and opera tion 
of the hitherto privately owned and 
operated lines with t he publ1oy owned 
rai lways followed a s a matj:t,ar of' ooul•se. (1 ) 
The wholesale . bankruptcy of so many 01 the p1•1va.tely 
o me _ Cana.d!.Sl!'l r.a1lways as r .1~ t~he renult or a tempo-
·rary poor 1.nanc1al cond1t1o.n~ but was r ather the ef-
reet of the complete financial · exhaustion or t · e re-
source a and· credit of the properties. A very s1milar 
eond1 t1on can no 1 be found bt:.~h.i.nd t.he b a.n 'U"'uptc:tea of 
many of the r!~ 1lways of the United St a.ta.s. Canatti an 
bankzn...tptcy took place notwithstanding very considerable 
aid by way of government loans whioh were ~ attempt to 
keep them solvent under priva t ·e otmersl11p. Our Re-
oonstruct1on Finance Corporation 10£j,ns to the many ail-
ing ra1lron:ds of this country were made 1n the hope that 
the roads could be kept solvent under private ownership. 
(1) Report of the Royal Commission, 1931-1932 
p .. 13. 
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profitably .:...B the Canadian Pao1t1o•s linea are managed .. 
The Canadian Pa.o1f1c has always been more profitable 
t ha."l t he Callr'.ld1sn National bu.t, not because the g overn-
ment was 1neff1a1ent in its control ~ Some operating 
stati tics f or the years 1930-1938 ar.., presented in 
tl' e accompanying table-.. 
Year 
-
1930 ,. 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
193? 
1936 
1937 
1938 
Operating Statistics of the Canadian 
~lationnl Railway (1930-38) (t) 
(Figures. !n thousands of dollars) 
Operating Operating Operating 
Revenues Exuen _es Ratio 
.• .. . 
256 . 291 . 235,:833 91.77 
200.505 199 .. 312 99.41 
161,103 ],55,_208 96.24 
148.,519 142,_812 96.16 
164r ..- .2 151.936 92~14 
173,184 :158,_926 91.76 
186.,610 171,477 91~89 
1 98.,396 180,788 91 •. 12 
182,.241 176.165 96.67 . 
.tet 
Income 
0•25,568 
- 0·60.,869 
D-61 •. 006 
D-60.017 
D-49.506 
D-48,878 
D-43,.197 
D-42 •. 028 
D-54.470 
Obvi usly, there 1s no prof·1t 1n the· operation of the 
Ca.nad.!an Uational Ra. il\mys in the last decade... The 
saallest deficit is over l . of a million ln 1.9.30 .. Ae a 
matt.er of f.act the only years 1n 1te existence 1n 
(1) SUlll!ilera, H .. .B ~ and R .. E •• The Reference Shelf . , 
rol. _l3. No . 8~ p~ 52. 
wbloh. 1t_ did not have a. deflcl.t were 1926 and 1928 
when there was a -small net income.. On the other hand 
The Canadian Pacific has been more profitable a s the 
f ollo ·1ng operat i ng figures will sho : 
Operating Stat1etics of the Canadian. 
Pacific Ra1lwal f l2lQ.:l§l {1) 
(Figures .. !l t-housands of dollars ) 
Operating Oper· .. trig Operating rJet 
Year Revenue 
-
Exp nses Ratio Income 
1930 196.211 153,:570 78e36 35,697 
193 154,963 124.448 80.03 11#501 
1932 130,45-0 105,554 80.91 D• 421 
1933 120,430 94,870 78.78 1,257 
1934 131,l~97 101,275 76 .. 73 6 .,459 
1935 135,208 107,175 79.63 2,832 
~ 
1936 143.,990 115,239 ao.o3 6.029 
1937 151-504 121,811 .80 .. 40 9,462 
1938 150.,.363 122,990 "81• lt262 
Some of the ~ensons f or the htgher operating ratio 
-of the government system are: (a} 1t has a larger mileage 
or light traf fic l ines; (b) 1ts pt-aperty and equipment 
were 1n poor phys1oal condition when aoqu1red f'rom1ts 
private owners; (c ) over wide competitive areas 1t still 
had 1 te reputation a e a._ ra!lroad eystern t make ··-;. '" ... h 
(1) Summers. H. B .. and R. E., Vol . 13 , J}o~ 8• P• 53. 
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the shipping and travelling public. From this latter 
reason springe the principal cause for the Canadian 
National's higher operating ratio. It attempts to 
compete throughout all of its system with the heavier 
patronized Canadian Pacific in all respects. It main-
tains ~xcellent service with low rates, both for pas-
sengers and freight. But, ''naturally the Canadian 
National with groas earnings per mile of line which are 
13.7 per cent less. than those of the Canadian Pacific, 
can hardly afford the same high standards of mainten-
ance and services as the Canadian Pacific." (1) As 
proof of the Canadian National's low rates the following 
table of average fares and rates is presented: 
Average Fares and Freight Rates (1923-38) 
of the Canadian National, Canadian 
Pacific and all Unite:d States 
Railways (2) 
Average for 
16 Years: 
Cents per 
u.s. 
2.45 
Passenger Mile 
C.P. C.N. 
Cents per Ton Mile 
U.S. C.P. C.N. 
{ 1923-1938 ) 2.51 2.45 1.04 .98 1.01 
Thus, the Canadian National Railways with much l ess 
traffic than either the Canadian Pacific or the average 
railroad of the United States has consistently maintained 
rates as low as either of these two. 
How the railroad problem in Canada can be best 
(1) Fournier, L. T., p. 124. 
(2) Summers, H. B. and R. E., p. 56 . 
eliminated 1s a r-~tudy a l l tn itsel f'. The ao1ut1on was 
not a ttempted here. 1ha.t was attempted was t o show 
• that there ea.n ·be ·.no fair oompa.r1son betvJeen the oper-
ation of ."th'e.-".c'.-C;."inadian National and the Canadian Pacific 
railroad systems. It cannot. be stated that -the Canadian 
experiment has proven government ownership and -operation 
a. poor second t o priva te pwne:r.sh1p e.nd operntion c:. S e.n 
ef icien t and ef'feotive method of .railroad ·management. 
-'oreov~r- , 1n the United States if govcx•nment o; nersh1p 
came it would be complete-; competition with private 
owner.:;hi p rould ve i mpossibl e .. 
Therefore. it is erroneous to point t o government 
o ,nerehi p in C~nnda a s a a r ning t.o wha t would h•lppen 
t o the r- ~t1lronds 1n t he United St a tee under the_ an.me 
method. : ihen the f acts are known t wo rea sons far thin 
stand out: '""'1rst~ Government ownership 1-n tb~ Urutvd 
St0tes ould not opera te under cond1 t1ons s1m1 o.r to 
t:hose that government ownership operate.s in Canada .. 
Second,. government management in Can ada 1e not p out• and 
inefficient as compared to private ownership the re. In 
t'act, Canadian governmental operat-J..::m under s uch adverse 
e1rcumstances is a point 1n f avor of publ i c ownerahip 
and operatl:on . 
Because government o mership and operation o~curs 
1n other lands (even in Canada) under euah diffuse con-
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ditions unparalleled here in the United States, there 
cannot be found a fair basis of comparison in these 
other nations from which can be predicated wit h what 
efficiency and effectiveness government ownership and 
operation could be carried on in the United States. 
Because such comparisons and co·ntrasts are im-
practical and unjust, there is one other study that is 
made to prove governmentally-operated railroads would 
be a failure in this country. .This is a study made 
of the operations of our railroads by the Federal govern-
ment during the World War. This has been the only major 
experience of the Federal government with the operation 
of the railroads. For a 26 month period during and 
shortly after the World War, all the railroads were 
opera ted by a Federal agency called the United States 
Railroad Administration. 
In assuming control of the railroads for more ef-
fective prosecution of the War, the government of the 
United States followed the example set by the British 
government which had taken over the railroadS of the 
United Kingdom a few weeks after the beginning of the 
World War. But President. Wilson1s desire was not simply 
to imitate the British. 
During the Summer and Fall of 1917 shipment of 
munitions and supplies to the Allies and the trans-
portation of millions of American soldiers to training 
camps--all 1n a dd! tio~~ to the ord~nary t~ansportat1on 
demnnd.s or c1v11 l ife--threw an .unbearable burden on 
the f f-l c.d. l i t; e - ot the railroads.. Opers t1tlg ;;ts units 
they we"'~ U.":1l ·' ~ .o.,_ 0 i', cope with the }.llorea sed demnnd. 
Eaete.rn l .:nes ·mare congested r1th freight and r . asaenger 
tr~:t.ffic uh1oh the r oads were una ble to move. ·In some 
sections · there 'Ja B an acute shor•t age of cars.. .I t '<-i ~ 3 
to rel ieve this s1tua t1.on by opera ting the r a1lrotlda 
a.s a single· tr- nsportat1on unit t hat government control 
was instituted in 1917 .. 
ne rea son why the r H.1l r oads were unable to meet 
the 11a.r-demand: t', s bee G. use for many ye;p rs previous to 
1917, the,.r program or extensions, enlargements and 
improvements ;:as f a r belou the normal r a. te or ea r l ier 
yea rs... As '1ill 1am J. Cunningham states: 
· Having in mind the f undamental f aet 
th~ t . during the ten years 1mmecU.;q.t,ely 
preceding the date of our part1c1pat1on 
1n the ~;rorld \ ar, the r n1lroads .of the 
c ountry had been unable to ecrn net 
1noome sufficient for them to maintain 
the1r credit and to attr act new aap1tal 
for needed. enlargements and improve-
ments of f acilities . .. (1) . 
nother factor that tended to bring about government 
c ontrol was the t act that the r "' ilror-1.d companies des-
pite good intentions could not unify themselves in prac-
tice into a 'Bingle s;etem necessary to c ope V"Jith the 
(1 ) Cunningham, ·, . J .. , American Railr oads· Government 
Control and Reconstruction Poilciee, t ew York, 
1§22) Po 20. 
unprecedented demand.. They e1rnply did not eo act 
becauee: 
It was against human nature to expect any 
s uch co pl ete unificat i on. I f a rail-
road comp,.rly vol untaril y surrendered traf-
fic which lt thought 1t could carry, t he 
resulting l ose of revenue as a loss to 
the comp ny's stookholders~ which was 
not authorized by them and not i ndemni-
fied aga1nst by the governuent.. (l) 
As f a r as ','Jar-ti me contr ol va s a test of govermnent 
ownership., t here 1a a ~· ide . ifference of opinion con-
cerning 1t :a success.. .~any believe t hat t he government's 
oper ,t1on of the r ailr oads ·as an unqualified success. 
a Pr-ofe ssor I. L. Sh rfman declared : 
·· ederal control accompl ished very credi-
tabl y t he purposes f or ·h1ch it was 1n-
st1tutedo In the f ace of unprec.edented 
difficulties , esaential traffic. whether 
purely mi l itary or industrial , was moved 
successfully and expeditiously, with a 
scrupulous and intell i gent regard for 
n a tiona l ends. The coat of traffic was 
decidedly reasonable .. -_ 1ere was no f lag-
rant neglect of ra1~r Ld plant and equip~ 
ment. whi l e for t he first time, the inter-
eat or labor 1n the c onduct of r a i l road 
tl'"alleportntion was accorded due recog-
niti on . (2) 
Others hold tha t government operPt ion ·as a t horough-
going fai lure. 'l'he Ra1 lr.ray Age at, t a ,..: 11 There \"Jae no 
sound reason for its adoption during t.he luBt n1"' ; in 
fact, 1ts dopt1on proved one of the worst mist akes 
made by the \trilson Administration .. u {3) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3 ) 
Hinee, .¥ .. D .. 11 • ar History of American Ra1lro ..!• ( e~ Haven,. 1922) p. 16. · 
Laidler, H. (1 . 11 American Ra1 l roads.o the Thirteenth 
Annual Debate Handbook 11 ( ~ew York,. 1 940 ) Vol. 1, P• 
· e ;a r and t he Traneport~tion Proble . a Railw .y 
Agel! September 16, 1939,. P• 397. 
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It see.ma that the f acts c oncerning the period ot 
g overnment operatton are capable of being ln:terpretated 
either way.. It. cannot be dented. hmvever. ~at govern-
ment control was suc.cessful . 1n clearing up t he acu~e 
tra1'f1-c snarl which had charac.terized private operat.i.on 
dPring the summer and It,all o.t 191.7.. The governm-ent wn.s 
also -sue.cas.sful 1n mov1ilg troops and supplies t.o points 
o.f embarka tion without delay dur1ng the entire . war-
t-ime period .. 
Analytically. aa a test ot the fitness and c apa-
b111ty of government management. the wa.r-t1me results 
of Federal c ontrol do not constitute a .sound arg.ument 
• ·1 ther for or aga1nst permanent government · ownership 
and operation... As ~~al lrer D. Hines declared: nFeder al · 
_.ontrol had neither the advnnts ges nor the disadvantages 
of permanent government Owt;lershlp and operat.ion .. r.t (1.) 
Federal control. does show strikingly the eeon-om1c. 
burdens and dlslo.aa.tions c.aused by war; but lt tbro rs, 
no 11ght on the mer 1 t s or demer1 t s of government. owner-
ship of the r ailroads in time .of peace... ihere was no 
certainty or permaneney about. the Jhole of government. 
wa:P-t1me c ontrol. There was no e:omprehen ive plan m. de 
or followed tor the bettarment or the railroads as a 
wbolep 
(1} Hln.es .• w. D.~~: War Hlat.or!: of .Amexoiaan Ra.1lroads 11 (New Haven , 1922 ) p. 231 .. 
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Some writers hold that the large increase in costs 
suffered under war-t~me control proves conclusively 
that government ownership and operation of the rail-
roads would be a much more expensive and wasteful method 
than is private ownership and management. The truth of 
the matter of increased costs is that: 
The increased cost of railroad operation 
during the period of Federal control was 
due to war and could not have been avoided 
by any other means of control. If privat e 
control had been retained, the increa sed 
cost of railroad operationwould still 
have to be met. ·.The war would still have 
had to be paid for, even in the case of 
private control of railroads. (1) 
The advocates for government control and their ad-
versaries have been bickering about the results of fed-
eral_ war-time control for many years; and a ll in vain. 
Emergency administration of the railroads in a time of 
c r i sis; and for a short temporary period; with no care-
f ully devised plan cannot be compared to peace-time oper-
a tion by the state over a long permanen~ period, rnd with 
a well deve l oped scheme of management. As far as Federal 
wa r-time control is concerned, the government acted 
very creditably in the operation of the railroads. But 
certainly, il the government were to acquire the rail-
roads for permanent operation, they would not go about 
(1) Hines, w. D., War History of American Rai l roads, 
(New Haven , 1922) p. 240. 
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:th1a huge task in any manne.r simila r ~co the ·~·1ay t hey 
they too~t control of -the roads- 1n l917. Cautious 
~nd unpreJ~d1c~d minds w111 proba b-ly accept t h is stat,e-
ment of ·::. J •. Cunningham_. Fro..fesaor of' Tr ansportation 
at the Gradt,tate -School of Business Adm1n1stra t1on , 
Harva rd Un1 ve-rsi ty • as the truth at least a s r -egar1s. 
the general 1ssu~! 
~ioth1 :ng definite can be proved from t-he 
resul ts of' 1918- 1919. A real tes~ ot 
Gcvernmen~ oper~t~on 1s possible only 
if' ca rried on over a long pe.ri<:J' f 
ttme-- one in wh1o-h oue1ness conditi-on s 
are norma l and in wh1eh poi 1t1cal ex-
pediency would have normal play... The 
wartime. period MS so abnormal t hat 
the result s Gi.l"e _val uel ess a s gu1des t o 
· \Vbat might be expeeted from s1m11ar 
c ontrol or _oomplete- government O?.ner-
ehip when normal conditions return,. (1} 
In any study of the railroad problem wi th reference 
to government ownership, the final question is how, after 
an intelligently developed plan of coordination has been 
completed, is government ownership to be effected and how 
will government operation function. That is to say, how 
will the government acquire the railways; and after ac-
quiring them , how will they manage them. 
In attempting to show how the railways will become 
a publicly owned and opereted industry, the general 
(1) Cunningham,. :[t': J .. lJ' American Railroads; Government 
Control EJnd R:econstruetlon Pol1c!es. ( rew York 9 
1922) Pe 279. 
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plqns la1d down by Coordinator Eastmo.n and: Senator 
••'heeler 1n their outlines for· government ownership 
and control V"111 be follc':r~. Tb.e1r plans ar(.t, per-
ha ps, the moat practical and carefully devised of any 
such· schemes presented for ult.tmate government owner~ 
ship and operation of the r a ilways. of t ;u~ Un1t ed St r1teeQ 
For the perm,anent ownership of t.he now p:riva.tely 
owned r a i lwuy propert-ies_, a. Federal corpor-a t-ion knovm 
by a. name euch a s ~he nunitad States Ra.1lwaye t' would 
be oreated by an. a.ct of Congress with a nominal amount 
of common stock to be held by the F:aderal Governmep:t ... 
'r hie corporation, raapo lS.lble for the managemr;nt of our 
ra1~way~,; i 111 be s.u148d py a board of trustee$ non~ 
. :.-_~ :~ - :. . . 
s1st1ng of five ~o e1gbt members appointed by the presi-
dent of the United .states. ~!'hey wou.l d be ppoint·ed 
1t h the advice a.nd counsel of the Sena te , and would 
h. -ve a tenure of office of ten years· 1t.h a salary o:f. 
f rom 15,000 t o 20_,000 d ol J.. -J. :r'S a yef.1r-. In order that 
replacement.s "~"' be effected eve-ry two or t hree years 11 
t he firat board to be appointed wo-uld t~ke o:f'f1ce for 
terms of two, f our, s1x etc .. years respec·t.ively; or. 
perhaps, t hree,e1x, nine etc. yea rs respectively~ Thus, 
the trustees wtll neither be wholly affected by changes 
1n adm1n1etrat1on, nor would aged. and incompetent. mem-
ber-s tend to be a part of the board. 
It. shall be :Pl .. ovided th..~t, the t rustees shall be 
persona who have had tt~lde experience., a nd who have dem-
onstrated ~a.pacit,y and executive e.bil i.ty 1n transporta-
t i on, f i na.n.cia.l and industrial matters. Their selection 
shall b made without regard to political affiliations. 
·aturally, t hi s . 111 not.. a l· a~~ b$ the oase; but with 
rotnt1n$ tenures, the board will a~ways be .free of pol l-
t ica l dom1natlon. During the t1me the t r.J.atet~ e alt on 
the boa rd., they shall devote all theil'' hours to the 
work of t he United States Rai lways and sha ll not en-
g .z_e ln any oth~r calling~ 
On a.eeuming office ~ they shall be requi red to t ake 
oa.th th-"it t hey will administer the propel.,ty of the United 
states Rail 1ays with compl ete ragard far the beat public 
interests ·; efficiently and effectively a s po-saible, with-
out reg,-r d for general or looal political conai dera tio11s .. 
The BotJ.rd of r rueteeo shall be e-njoined, to: 
(1) 
il~nage :the rail r oads so a s to produce net 
earnings after provls1.ons for expeneE;Js 
o.f oper ... tion_,. reserves fo~ depNceiat1on 
or future contigenc.ies , tues, rental s. 
and fixed obligations including fund 
provisions.. Any earnings remaining 
after t aking ca re of these cha rges 
may be ueed at the d1so.ret1on o-f . tQ.e 
Board of •rrustees f or the a c qu1s1t_1on 
of property, the paying oi' i.hdebt,edneae,. 
or the payment of diVidends. (1 ) · · 
Wilson,. G. L., The~ Pronosals of the Wheeler B1ll , 
Sec-tion 2, Par agraphs {r) and (g} . · Annal s of the 
American Academy of Soc1al a nd Political ,;:,cience:~ 
Vol .. 187, September, 1936, p .. 133- 134. 
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tne first step in actually aoqulrlng the r ailroads 
~ould be the appointment of a. tempor ry man · gement like 
th,~_t f the United St ates a.1lroad Administration .. 
The y t7ould manage the r 1lrouds 1n the interim betv1een 
t he negotiations and the completion of government owner-
ship. 
Pending :f1nr · settle ent \lth the pri vate ovme rsl) 
a provi s i on" 1 'Z--ental t'i'OU d be necessa ry s imll!:!r to the 
standar d !'eturn ·of t he ~io.rld Alr perlodo In pre-deter-
mining the amount of this rental: 
One nay ould be to use a s a measure the 
best operating r ai lway income (net) e arned 
by each oper ting r a11raod company in any 
of the ye rs from 1930 to 1940. lbe St at-
ute would provide tor the pa yment of euoh 
a rental for the period prior to t he vest-
ing of the titl e to the property in the 
United St ates R i l·ways .. (1) 
If t he r 1l ro. d companies believe that t hey were not 
receiving a f air deal, then! "they !lould have t he right 
t o contest this r ental in court . 1f it wns deemed t o be 
unjust compens""' tion f or t he use of such propert1es. n (2) 
To determine the value of and compl ete the purchase 
o-r t he r a1l r o ds a specia l commission appointed by the 
President with ·the advice and consent of t he Senate 
would supervise these matters .. The a.nnu.;-al budget of 
this commission 18 to be approved by that, division of 
the Interstate Commerce Oomt 1sa1on to which f inancial 
(1) Eaetman 0 J " B.» Publ ic Ownershi;e and Operl'l t1on of 
Ra1l ro· da inthe Uri1ted States, Annals of the t roer-
rcan Academy, Vol o 187, September, 1936, p. 115 . 
(2) Ibid., Po 115-
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mat-ters -are assigned. \'lh•n approved~ the budget 1s 
to be borne eventually by the United. Sta tes Railways 
as a capital charge .. 
In thEt exercise of its functions the comm1se1on 
will n§ed the pOwers to (a) ad;rt1n1ster o-aths; (b} to 
subpt.:ens. witnesses and compel their attendanoe a.e well 
as the production of books, correspondence and records; 
and. (o) to talte testimony 1n proceedings before 1t .. (1) 
:·r1tnesee:s shall not be excused :rrom testifying or pro-
ducing documentary evidence upon the ground that t.h.e 
oral or written testimony will tend to 1ner1m1nate them 
in -9:ny ivay. No witnesses should be prosecuted on ac-
count or any self-1ncr1m1na t1ng. teetlmony or evidence .. 
Only perjury &hou l d be prosecut~d. 
The securit ies of the Unit.ed St ates Rai lways would 
be the media used 1n the final settlement for the com-
plete r a i l r oad properties .. Obviously,, w1th the r ail-
roads worth anywhere . t•rom fifteen to twenty five ·billion 
dollars,. a. cash transaction would be 1.mpose1ble. ! t \"1111 
be fa.1r and de.stra ble to see th...A..t the present holders 
of r ailroad securities wil l have an opportunity to 
benefit- ·nth1n reasonable l ·tmlt s · .from any future 1n-
creaee.s 1n earnings when and 1f' they are realized. 
(1) Wi l s on. L .. G., The ProThsala of the -\~heeler 1311!_, 
Section 8• Paragraphs a) .• (ti) and (d) • Annals or 
the American Academy. Vol. 187,. September ~~ 1936 
p .• 135. 
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The railroad companies would obtain payment for the 
most part 1n t he guar anteed debenture bonds that would 
be 1esued by the United St a tes Railways.. Incident ally, 
valunt1on woul d be dete ined from ea rning power a d 
not on any kind of c s-t O!" re_la.cem.e t alue • 
. rz- .. Eastman proposes also tha t the companies or 
the owners of the securities could, however, be given 
the option of a private settl ement on c. ,~1fferent - - is,. 
and one negotiated by the trustees. The general basl s 
f or such a settlem.. ·nt would be payment 1n part in guara.n~ 
teed debent'l.U"es .a nd 1n part by stock. The amount of 
bonds noul d be adequate to protect the carriere' bonds 
of pr oven .earning capacity • and it wot.· ~~..d be supplemented 
by .~. r a ther 11ber 1 allotment of non-guaranteed secur1-
ties9 the object of which would be to give t e present 
secu:r-lty holders an opportunity to benefit f'rQm a pos-
s ible higher future earning po~r which cannot at pree-
ent·oe shown or estimated. (1) 
The oppor tunit1e.s which such voluntary settlem t'lt, 
would aff ord ar~ dependent upon the success of the 
method of opera ting t he r ail ay properti es after they 
have been acquired by the government .. 
The governm-=..nt would make good ... -.ny deficiencies in 
(1 ) Eastman,. J .. B • • Publ ic Ownership and Operation at 
Rai lroads in the United St a tes, Annal s of the .... eri-
oan l' cademy, Volo 187 0 September , 1936., p. 1~6 . 
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earnings w1 th respect to the final obliga tions. . but 
not with re.spact to a.n3' cont1gent securities~ The same 
treatment would be accor-ded to. any deficiencies in the 
payment of rent;:; ls during t he interim between negot.1a-
t.1on and ownership. 11'he powers of the United Stat e s 
.Railway as stated in the ilhee1er Railroa d Bill would 
be! 
1 .. t o adopt and use a corporate seal 
2. to have suecess1on until dissolved by 
act of Congress 
3. to malre corttracte 
4. to sue and be sued,. complain and defend 
in any state or Federal court o.f law 
or equity . 
5 .• t:0 adopt, amend and repeal by-laws 
6 .. t o exercise the right of eminent domain to 
acquire t he property and f acilities of any 
common carrier of property or passengers 
for hire by any means of transportation 
subject to prior approval of the Inter-
state Commerce Oomm1ss1on aft.er notice 
anti, public hearing O·f the terms and ·· · 
c ondit1ons of the aequlsitton .. 
7 .. to acquire propert.y ,g,nd faeilltios of com-
mon carrier~ otherw:1 r.e than through the 
. exercise of the right of eminent. domain,. 
subjeo't to . the a.ppro~tnl of the Interst9. t e 
Commerce Comm1ns1on . 
8 . to opera te t •. e property and f ao.111tle.e 
acquired or contr'olled by it in t he con-
duct or bus1nass ae a c ommon carrier. 
9. t o issue and f'ix the terms anJi conditions 
) 
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o:f aectl:r"1.t1ea, and. .... 
10.. suoh powe~e 1n add1t1on to those speo1-
f1cally gr· nted as may be necessary or 
ina 1dental to f'ulfi r -1ng the purposes 
or the c.rea t!on.. (1) 
Dissenting atockholdere o!' t.he priva·te carrler'e• parties 
t c contracts which provide- f or the dispoeition ·or all 
or subetant~lly all of their property, franch1see.-
etc. , and . ho are entitled to r eceive- payment. in cash 
f o r their shares., shou~d have the- power to register 
- t-he ir dissent upon eompl1ance \¥1th oenain c ond1t.1ons .. 
I .f any of the r a i lroads which are to be t aken over 
a r e in the midst of bankruptcy proceedings of wh1ch t here 
a re many, the board of t rueteas of the proposed Unlted 
St ates Railways will hHve t he power- t o suomit a re• 
organ:lzat1on plan t o them pre-vious to a c quiring t hat. 
part of the properties which are bankrupt .. 
< 
Taxes on the issue. sale o-r delivery of securities 
made 1n a acord_anae w1th tha a c quiring of the properties 
by the -Federal government should b-e t ax exempt. Also 
any g~1ns made f rom the s a le. or othe-r diapoe1t1on o# - -
property or income und~P any approved plan of government 
O\vnership ahould be exempt from any ta~ntion except. 
those gains made poss1-P~f.f by the sa le or dtstr1but1on 
of the properties or aecur1t1es. (: . 
( 1) · l ilson.- L. G .. •· The Proposals of the ~~beeler 13111. 
Sect1.on 5 11 Par agraphs (a}. (b).- (o). (d) and (e) 
Annals, Vol. 187 • ~ptember ., 1936,, P• 135 .. 
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J! ccording t o Wheeler 11 taxes assessed upon the car-
r1ers eu.bse ctuent.~ to tf1e paa Bing of the bill a r$ planned 
t o be paid by the United States Rai lwaya; while those 
l.ev1ed prior :to< -that t1me ~'1111 oo borne by the carriers 
thems-elve s as,·they would be or dinari ly . 
The board of trustees would have the final s ay 1n 
matters or r a te makln :> and r ate a.d ju·st1ng ~,,ltnough the 
~~'heeler bill proponee . that the Commission shall have 
reasonable latitude to modl.fy or adJu.et any partiaular 
rate ~llhich it may find wtjust. or unreasonable. (l} It 
c anno-t malte rates which prove t .o te insufficient ""o de-
fray the fair ex.penues of oper e tlon a nd provide revenues 
sufficient to pay interest on debentures, and some d1v1~ 
dnede upOn cont1gent aecurltias. It the Commission does 
so, then~ t he board of tl'"Ustees should have t he po ~er 
t o restrl.ct the ~omm1-seion by setting r "' tes they, t hem-
selves., believe mox·e adaqua.t .ely -cover expenses. !'he 
C.o aston would be barred from suspending sueh ra·tes .. -
.. o doubt-. there woul d be much tl-"Ouble encountered 
1n installing a."t1y sueh plan as the one outlined here. 
Be1ri:g national 1n ae-ope., and thereby a t fect1ng ao many 
1ndtv1duals and groups, the allmina t1on ot many dif-
ficul ties would be a long and t.ed1ous pr ocess.. Bat 
1:f a we-ll organized and capable tempor s.ry c.omin1es1on 
( 1) Wheeler-, Be K. 11 Government Acgu1st1on and Oper-:· t1on 
ot Railroads 1n the United States, :mne.ls 11 Vol. 187 ~ September, i 936, p. 145. 
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1 s o.ppo!nted t o put. such a plan i nto ef'f'ect, there 1 e 
l ittle doubt that, given a suff1c1.ant length of time·, 
the successful ac ompl1shment of the plan would be 
assured. Allowance must be m~de• of course, f or many 
minor changes that. ould be necees~ry. 
Ina smuch a s consol!d t1on along s ou..1':ld linea ! a 
. highl y de sir._, ble. from the viewpoints of re stre.1nt on un-
economic . competiti on and reduction of preventable 
wa.et& in needless dup11cat.1.on~ and of solution of. the 
sep11rate problem of the weak rallroa.d: .• aueb a plan tor 
nation• 11zation .of the r ailr oads of the United Sta.tes 
would f?..tidant l y 1n time be a success.. When r a ilroads 
had a virtual monopoly on inland t.raneporta t1on heal tlly 
competition. between r a ilroads was 1n certain ways 1n 
the public lntereE!t; but non that 'the monopoly t;.aa been 
bi', .. !len by the newer modes of transporta.-~1on, c ·ompetlt1on 
be£ een senara~e r ai l road syste s is unnece.esa ry and 
ha.rn ul 1n encouraging needle.es d~te 1n service and 
· rac11it1ee. Therefore ...,. na t1on .. w1de plan or ooord1nnt1 n 
a nc1 consolid.2.t1on undel"' government oxm.ersh 1p is the beat 
r~medy for t he ailments under whioh our r a11roads ar e 
nowsuffer . ng .. 
Ja.ny are the ch'· rge:.s t hat h . ve bee1. mnde aga1nst 
'the 1neff1ciency and gra ft. th·l-t will a bound under public 
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ownership. St:at1.st1cs purpo:rting to p1~ve that public 
o\'lnershlp :ls wasteful and pol1t1oally COJ:ltx•ollod have 
been publ lehed b~t .: 
l'hese statintics heve nothing to de with 
the question of government owriersh1p 
aru!f opera t.ion or the r a ilroads by the 
: Amer1c.an peopl e for their ovm great -
est benefit. When ·the proper time 
c.omes • and when pub~1e sentiment is 
suff'1a1ently intare.sted and sufficiently 
convinced that public ownerehi p is nec-
esfJary ·to Lh<J general walf£~re. public 
OWnership will c ome. (1) · 
.From a study of the ra.i l.t•o::td~-and their future pros-
pecte 9 the p:roo:per time for government o·.'lnership ~ .nd 
oper tion is s .1!ft.ly approaching.. Fublic ownereh1p 
will be ben ef"icial to the public welfa z•e under an 
1ntell.1gently foz"!!led plan or nat1onal1z.a t1on :tor the 
ra1 reads of t he Uni.ted States .. 
(l) Wheeler. B. K •• Q:_ovemm.ent Ac qui .aition and. ·owr a tlon 
of Jta1lroads fol" the United St ates, Annals,. Vol. 187. 
September,. 1936. p~ 145. 
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Concl usion 
This n t1on~s growth hne bean due in a l ' r>ge pa.n 
to the r a.1lroadsQ 1thout adequate tr-nsport t1on fa.c1l-
1t1es the davelopnent of such a large area. from a wilder-
ness int unified · ·country could not have t aken pla.~e . 
1n so h.ort time. The railroad has been and is the 
com on hlghroa.d, so t o speak. It 1s not a concern., there-
f ore, in J ioh the f armer and the' manufacturer o:.-lone re 
interested . l t ie' an essential to the commerc1a.l·l1fa 
of our p ople; the nation ha s grown up to be phys1cclly 
dependent upon the r 1l roads... Perhaps , no other p o__;le 
a r so bound up as e are 1n economic interdepen enca .. 
'o one coli"lmunlty 1n ll thin land lives of or by itself; 
and 1nao:fa.r ae it 1a dependent upon outside genc1es for 
1te existence and we ll-be1ng9 1t 1s to tLe same degree 
dependent upon t,he r a i lroads. True, oth~r. modes of trans-
portation are ut!l::.zed 1n some instances but their uses 
a nd va1lab111ty nr$ l1nllted.. 'l1h many yet 1dely ditrer~ 
gent purposes whlch the· r a ilroad serves. cannot be realized 
through or by any other means of transportation. 
Ot nll the factors that have contributed to the 
gro th f e!'!.lth, t the increase of materi al comfort~.~ 
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and t o t he di ffusi on or 1nformnt1.on and kno ledge. the 
r n 1 l rond h~ s played t.Lu ruOst prominent part o It has 
~idened t he fiel d f or the d1v1s1on or employments; it 
has l.essened production cc~1t s ; :Lt has promoted exchange 
nd has facilitated intercommu.."l1c tion.. In 1te aggre ·-· 
gate 1t represents a larger investment of capital and, 
pe-rhaps" more labor than ~.ny other singl e branch or o.om• 
merc. i a l activity . The service that it renders and has 
rendered to society is. both from the industrial nd 
oommerc1 .. ~1 _ •nt of v1eu. grea ter than 1s rendered by 
any oth r service to t7h1ch men devote their time t:m,d 
t h eir energie·e . 
.. 11 the ~1eal th of the rorest.. the mine and the f ,. rm 
is 11\t.l e -!Or · th n junk VJithout th~ means of transport-
t1on whicr_ ··he r a i l _ oads o-rter., Of wh t value are the 
p r1~ha.ble fru1t.e of a Florida or a Ca.l1forn1a 1f t h e 
vast eas~ern markets re not de ava ilable by the H 1,1-
r oads. 'Ihe co ton crop _oul d 'be but a fruitless tr~r·den 
of sout hern f ar ms if t here were no r -1lroa.ds t o carry i t 
to the aeabour d, .. The United wt a t ee cannot count its 
flen. l th or ~ reatnes ' 1n terms tha t do not point fa.~ their 
e1gn1f1cnnce t o our r 1l r o d system. 
cause. then. the r a1lro ds or t his n t1on are eo 
vital to i ts progress and prosperity .. 1t !s only l ogical 
tha t their 7e l -being and s oundness shoul d be of gre3t 
importance - nd eoneern. to both th people and the govern-
ant.. 'l'o dlecount the 1nd1apensab111ty of the :railroads~ 
or to jeopardiz.e. their existence 1e to shake the very 
f ounda.t1oue of the nation .. 
Tod .... y, the ra!l.road eystam of t h i s country is having 
1ts 11-be!ng enda n ered, nd 1t . existence threatenea. 
Ind1vidue.lly cJld prl'\rate ly oooad and opera ted ra1.lroads 
have over> o. period of the last decade been appro· ching 
nearer and nearer to the point; or exhaustion an"· conse-
quent ao11apoe. Indi 1du.r-.Lly1 un er adverse conditions 
nhieh appear no.· to be perm~nent.. these ra.il.roa.da ea.n 
have 11t'·le hope of ever ret,urning to a prosperoue and 
seoUrft t . tus. Combination and its resulting eff'1oienc1ea 
is the only method mereby the r~ilroads ean "gain be-
aom:e a f1n~tnc1Hl1y sou..'!'ld and et~reot1ve industry .. · But 
after a study of tha problem, and discovering the l;·a..x! ty 
and gen ral 1 cl~ of' crneern.,. the frc nk un d llingness to 
consol! te !). 1 t ap:9ct~t:trs the wiser- poltey to have the no.t-
lorial gotrernm ·nt pureha.se the railroads :f'rom their pr1-
vat e om er•s be_·ore their condlt,ion becomas. worse. Under 
an inte·s"'•a tlng and aste-e:!.1mina.ting pl an of operation 
the gover ment e uld more sucoea ef'ully mana.go the r ·q 11-
r oade t.h n t eir private ownera are do1P..g t present .. 
And what is ... ost 1mport.ant, the coll~pse of the v1hole 
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r 1lt-oad system mel its resul tant etfeats upon the 
li.xe of t he whole nation nould be eliminated .. 
Publ 1 o mersh1p of r a1lro ds in t heory is 1r-
refr·g .bl e.. " 1J..roada re a publ ic serv1oet it 1e just 
and rlgbt tha t t .1ey should be opera ted by publ ic serv~;_..nts 
in the public interest.. Na.tur 1ly 11 !n p actlceg govern-
ment. mm rsh i p and oper:-1 t 1o of the r ; 11ro ds 1ould p1 ove 
!ts-lf impe.l~feet 1n some respects.. "· any trou .. l e t her e 
re :7h1oh. c,-nnot ba e l l m1n te un er any m-.:,n-o g .. ; ent. ;mt 
1t, on the o her h · d •. pe nent n t.S.on :-A.l intere t n c r e 
_nvolved, nd l"1V.: tG Q\-mershl~ 1 s unable t o s afeguard 
1 prot ect the~e 1ntere ta, t hen, it# 1s "better t h t the 
sto.t s u d. cqulre an op · te. the· r a1lro.r c1e.. ·r~e s tate 
m at prevent the oontln 1...-noe of - po icy which is pre-
Ju 1o a t c t • ose intere .te" hmllever muob it might be t o 
the advnnt~ e;e of the r. ilro -d industry as commercia l 
enterpr'-.ae ... 
I.f priv· te e.terprlsa would or could eho a re .... son-
-bl '-'-"-· co. t}."lj.ct~ve pr ogr<tlm hereby fin · nola stnb1-1ty 11. 
e f f ie. :tent o I\ t ins c on - :t t i ons .... nd. a r eu.l t <:mt r t m t o 
pro -1tablencos eoul d be effected Lhrough 1ts activity 
n w1 tbout "the n.1d ot the ""eder~ l g ~ vernment,. public. 
otmereh1p i n t he United St a tes \-7ould not be necessary .. 
t t t h.ex-· t hr ou 1.-..ck of de sire., 1ndiv1d l is 9 or 
a. spirit of r asi on,- t10tl. t he United Stat.es rf i l r o&d in·· 
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dust,ry has eome for ;ard ~1 th no lggica l proposa l 01!" plan 
i: h ereby the n !.lt ents besetting t he r :l1lroad eyst ··m ·aoul 
b .... llevia.t e " fo r. t he present and 1n the nea.r :fut lU'e p · :r·-
manently e1·1£ 1na t d 9 
Generally spea dng, ·the !'.: 1lro· ds continue t o ouera.te 
ccumul - t1ng = etieadlly mounting deficit!) dependin~ on 
government for a id in t he form of l~ rge ~oans · t lo· 
i nterest ra.tea . un ble to :r:-,-ise the necas ... ry funds through 
private borrowing~ and plodd1n6 on f r om ye~:.r to year · ~11th 
lees and lees hope of ever ags1n becoming a profitr hle 
nd ~1n::mc1nlly secure industryo 
l s .. vital ff~ c tor i n our n" t i on · l economy, the only 
thing left for the ra1lro· ds is complete govern ent . o .mer.;.. 
. ship· an oper-9t1on;- tdth e·"' f 1c.1ent me.nagcu ant by com-
petent transpor t a ;..1on experts r;orking for a ~ ederal corp-
or~tion oper ting indepenr-ently of pol1t1ca . I n oon-
c lueion, 1t might be said tba t even to thooe who do not 
ord!n :rll y favor state ownershi p and oper .- t1onil such a 
plan can __ ot poe ,.bly place t he r ailro ~ s in a posl t 1on 
ny worse th ~n that which they ::1re no '1 suffel"'1ng under 
private d.om1nB.t1on.. On the ot.her ha.nd,. the cha nces f .or 
success a re not figmentaryo~ lna Federal government hae 
1n ot her instances shown itself aapable of succeae.f'ully 
con uct!ng business enterprises .. 
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